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We consider the economics models of network interconnections. The network 
is connected by several communication links, which are owned by a number of service 
providers. Service providers can set interconnection fee on the links they own. Each 
service provider wants to maximize its total revenue, giving rise to an n-stage non-
cooperative game. At each stage, the service provider will change the rental price for 
the link it owns based on the price of its competitor in the last stage. Also, users 
choose routes that minimize cost, which include both link price and link congestion. A 
Nash equilibrium point exists when no service provider finds it beneficial to alter the 
rental price of the links. 
We investigate the Nash equilibrium of the price configuration of such 
systems. We prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium point of a communication 
network under reasonable concavity conditions. A "Cookbook" procedure is also 
introduced to find out the equilibrium of such network. We construct simple example 
of network consisting of only parallel links and serial links to shows the economic 
properties of the interconnection network, such as competition and social welfare. The 
effects of a dominant service provider is also analyzed through a simple network 
consists of only four links. The relationship between pricing and routing is also 
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described. An extensive study of Internet Economics and Internet Pricing is also done 
in complement to this research. 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - II -
Acknowledgements 
I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Joseph Y. Hui for 
his valuable advice , guidance and support in this research work. I would also like to 
thank Prof. Victor K. Wei for his help in my FYP and PDP. I would also like to thank 
Rachel Wong and Jack Poon who give me some mental support. Besides, I am pleased 
to have discussions with my friend Cheng Sze Wan. These discussions have benefited 
me a lot. 
Finally, I would like to thank Henry Yu, Lewis Chau, Edward Yau, Terence 
Chan, Tsz Lung, Jeff Cheng and Eric Hu, who made the office an interesting place to 
work. Also the supports given by my Outward Bound, Engineering and M.Phil friends 
are valuable to me. 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - III -
List of Figures 
FIGURE 1: HOSTS TREND BY NETWORK WIZARDS fHTTP:/7WWW.NW.COiVn 3 
FIGURE 2: THROUGHPUT VS. DELAY. 5 
FIGURE 3: DELAY-THROUGHPUT OPERATmG CURVES FOR GOOD AND BAD ROUXmG 6 
FIGURE 4: GRAPH REPRESENTATION OF A NETWORK WITH TWO OD PAIRS W, AND W2.. 7 
FIGURE 5: SUPPLY AND DEMAND MODEL 12 
FIGURE 6: TRAFFIC FLOW FOR TWO mTERNET HUBS 15 
FIGURE 7: BUDGE SET 21 
FIGURE 8: EFFECT ON mCREASE IN ESTCOME 22 
FIGURE 9: EFFECT N CHANGE IN PRICE OF ONE GOOD 22 
FIGURE 10: ][NDIFFERENCE CURVE: A L L POINT ON THE SAME ^DIFFERENCE CURVE IS 
OF THE SAME PREFERENCE. 24 
FIGURE 11: UTIL ITY MAXIMIZATION REQUIRES REACHING THE HIGHEST ATTAESTABLE 
ESfDIFFERENCE CURVE. 25 
FIGURE 12: ESrcOME AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS 28 
FIGURE 13: DERIVATION OF DEMAND CURVE 29 
FIGURE 14: MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 34 
FIGURE 15: GRAPH REPRESENTATION OF A NETWORK WITH TWO OD PAIRS Wi AND W2. 
43 
FIGURE 16: SUPPLY AND DEMAND CURVE 47 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - IV -
FIGURE 17: A GENERAL NETWORK EXAMPLE, (3 LE^KS, 2 〇D PAIRS, 2 OWNERS, 4 PATHS) 
55 
FIGURE 18: ANOTHER GENERAL NETWORK PROBLEM, (5 UNKS，1 OD PAIR, 2 OWNERS, 3 
PATHS) 61 
FIGURE 19: PARALLEL NETWORK 67 
FIGURE 20: SERIAL NETWORK 76 
FIGURE 21: SERIES-PARALLEL NETWORK 87 
FIGURE 22: PRICE REACTION CURVE OF P! 92 
FIGURE 23: PRICE REACTION CURVE FOR P2 , 92 
FIGURE 24: PRICE REACTION CURVE FOR P3 92 
FIGURE 25: SERIES-PARALLEL NETWORK WITHOUT POLICY 96 
FIGURE 26: SERIES-PARALLEL NETWORK WITH POLICY 96 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - V -
List of Tables 
TABLE 1: HOSTS COUNT BY NETWORK WIZARDS rHTTP://WWW.NW.COM) 2 
TABLE 2: COMMUNICATIONS AND ROUTER COSTS (NONHNAL US$ PER MILL ION BITS) 11 
TABLE 3: SWITCff lNG AND E^TER-HUB LE^K COST PER ISP 15 
TABLE 4: A PAYOFF MATRIX OF A GAME 36 
TABLE 5: NASH EQUILIBRIUM 37 
TABLE 6: A GAME WITH NO NASH EQUILIBRIUM ( m PURE STRATEGIES) , 38 
TABLE 7: ITERATION RESULT FOR SERIES-PARALLEL NETWORK WITHOUT POLICY WITH 
CP=100,E= l ,G= l ,C2= l ) 97 
TABLE 8: ITERATION RESULT FOR SERIES-PARALLEL NETWORK WITH POLICY WITH 
(F=lOO,E=l ,Cy=l ,C2=l) 98 
TABLE 9: ITERATION RESULT FOR SERIES-PARALLEL NETWORK WITH POLICY WITH 
(F=100, E=lO, Cy=3, C2=3) 98 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - VI -
Contents 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING 1 
ABSTRACT I 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS III 
LIST OF FIGURES IV 
LIST OF TABLES VI 
CONTENTS VII 
CHAPTER 1 1 
Introduction 1 
1.1 What is Internet? 1 
1.2 Internet Routing and Pricing 3 
1.3 Overview of QoS Routing 4 
1.3.1 Classification of Routing 6 
1.3.2 Optimal Routing 7 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - VII -
1.4 An Introduction to Internet Economics 8 
1.4.1 Intemet Extemality 9 
1.4.2 Current Pricing Practice 10 
1.4.3 Network Interconnection 14 
1.4 Organization ofThesis ^^ 
CHAPTER 2 13 
Economic Theory for Interconnection Model 18 
2.1 Introduction 18 
2.2 Demand and Supply 20 
2.2.1 Consumer Behavior 20 
2.2.2 Demand Curve 25 
2.2.3 Price Elasticity 30 
2.2.4 Estimation ofMarket Demand 32 
2.3 Market Structure 33 
2.3.1 Competitive Firm 34 
2.3.2 Monopoly 35 
2.3.3 Oligopoly 35 
2.4 Game Theory 35 
2.4.1 The PayoffMatrix of a game 36 
2.4.2 Nash Equilibrium 37 
2.4.3 Mixed Strategies 38 
2.4.4 Existence ofNash Equilibrium 39 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - VIII -
2.5 Summary 卯 
CHAPTER 3 40 
Problem Formulation Interconnection Network for Pricing and Routing in Internet 40 
3.1 Introduction 40 
3.2 Problem Formulation 41 
3.2 Existence ofNEP Interconnection Network 46 
3.3 A "Cookbook" Procedure 53 
3.4 Cookbook Examples 54 
3.5 Summary ^^ 
CHAPTER 4 66 
Price Competition for Interconnection Models 66 
4.1 Introduction 66 
4.2 Competitive Pricing ofParallel Networks 66 
4.2.1 Model and Problem Formulation 67 
4.2.2 Existence ofNash Equilibrium Point 68 
4.2.3 Numerical Example and Properties 71 
4.3 Price Collusion for Serial Networks 75 
4.3.1 Model and Problem Formulation 75 
4.3.2 Existence ofNash Equilibrium Point 77 
4.3.3 Numerical Example and Properties 79 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - IX -
4.4 Summary ^^ 
CHAPTER 5 85 
Price Distortion for Series-Parallel Networks with Dominant Carriers 85 
5.1 Problem Motivation and Formulation 85 
5.2 Properties under NEP 90 
5.3 A Simple Simulation 95 
5.5 Summary 98 
CHAPTER 6 99 
Conclusion ^^ 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 102 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - X -
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 What is Internet? 
Over the past decades, advancement of computer and data communication 
technologies in information delivery services created an exponential increase of 
bandwidth demands in various kinds of services, such as Internet telephony, Intranets, 
and interactive Video on Demand. More people can use inexpensive equipment to 
connect to the Internet and use the service. 
The Internet is a network of networks, which is a world-wide network of 
computer networks that use a common communication protocols called TCPAP 
(Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol) for interoperability. It came into 
existence in the late 70's, when the Advanced Research Projects Administration 
(ARPA), a division of the U.S. Defense Department, developed the ARPANET to link 
together universities and high-tech defense contractors. Later in the mid-eighties，NSF 
created the NSFNET to provide connectivity to its supercomputers or researchers and 
used the TCP/IP protocol to provide a high-speed backbone for the developing Internet. 
When NSFNET ceased operation at 1995, several privately operated backbones came 
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into existence and provided connectivity for universities, commercial sites, 
governments, etc to the Internet. Regional networks are connected directly to each other 
through network access points [8], or by Internet hubs [4:. 
Table 1 [1] gives the trend of the estimated number of hosts in the Internet. We 
can see that on average, the number of hosts increased by over 100% per year and the 
graph for the trend is given by figure 1 • 
Date No. of Hosts % increase 
Aug81 213 N/A 
May 82 235 10% ‘ 
Aug 83 562 139% 
Oct84 1,024 82% 
Oct 85 1,961 92% 
Nov 86 5,089 160% 
Dec 87 28,174 454% 
Jul88 33,000 17% 
Jul89 130,000 294% 
Oct 90 313,000 141% 
Jul 91 535,000 71% 
Jan 92 727,000 36% 
Jan 93 1,313,000 81% 
Jan 94 2,217,000 69% 
Jan 95 5,846,000 164% 
Jan 96 14,352,000 146% 
Jan 97 21,819,000 52% 
Jan 98 29,670,000 36% 
Jan 99 43,230,000 46% 
Table 1: Hosts count by Network Wizards (http://www.ti~w.coni) 
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No. of Hosts from Aug 81 to Jan 99 
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Figure 1: Hosts trend by Network Wizards rhttp:/Avww.nw.com) 
1,2 Internet Routing and Pricing 
When we talk about the Internet, there are two main issues to consider, the 
routing problem and the pricing problem. The Internet is not a point-to-point 
connection, but are connected through various backbones and gateways [20]. Li order 
to transmit a message from the source to the destination, routers use some kinds of 
routing algorithm to guide packets through the communication subnet to their correct 
destination [15]. Traditionally，routing algorithms are based on the shortest path routing 
in which traffics choose the least costly path for connection. The current pricing 
mechanism is the so-called flat-fee model [7]，[8], [21] in which users need to pay a 
fixed amount of monthly fee and they can surf the net for an unlimited amount of time. 
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From the users' point of view, they just want to maximize their own utility 
without much consideration of congestion. Since they don't need to pay extra, they will 
overuse the Internet, causing unnecessary congestion. There are many literatures that 
discuss the issue of Internet resource allocation and pricing models that deals chop with 
the congestion problem. 
On the other hand, there are some economic factors associated with the current 
Internet interconnection architectures, which have enabled the Internet to grow with the 
number of applications, number of users, and amount of network traffic [4], [27]. 
Service providers who own the interconnection links charge the price of the links that 
maximize their total profit. Issues about competition and dominance will arise, which 
may lead to market inefficiency. We would like to study the mechanism of the price 
setting in the Internet in order to have a better understanding of the economics and 
Internet interconnection issues. 
1.3 Overview of QoS Routing 
We refer routing algorithm as the network layer protocol that guides packets 
through the communication subnet to their correct destination [15] and it is a very 
complex process. It requires the coordination between all the nodes in the enterprise, 
notjust a pair of nodes. Also, it must cope with link and node failures and dynamically 
adapt to the changing environment. There are two main issues in routing, which is the 
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throughput (quantity of service) and average packet delay (quality of service) as seen 
from figure 2, 3. Good flow control allows more traffic into the network while good 
routing algorithm keeps delay low. 
[ Delay j 
I I 
I I 
I I I I 
I I 
t ^ Delay 
‘ 
I I 
——Offered l o a d ^ Flow control Throughput~~• Routing 」 
Rejected load ‘ 
i 
Figure 2: Throughput vs. Delay. 
Under high offered load conditions, a good routing algorithm will increase the 
throughput for the same value of average delay and to decrease average delay under 
low and moderate offered load conditions as seen in the following figure: 
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一 J J 
^ ^ ¾ ^ 
Throughput 
Figure 3: Delay-throughput operating curves for good and bad routing 
1.3.1 Classification of Routing 
There are a number of way to classify routing algorithm, one way is to divide 
them into centralized and distributed while the other one is to divide them into static 
and dynamic. 
In a centralized routing algorithm, all the routing decision is made in the central 
node while in the distributed routing algorithm, all the nodes can contributed to the 
routing decision. 
In a static routing algorithm, the route is made fix regardless of the network 
condition, while in a dynamic routing algorithm, the routing decision changed as the 
network condition changes. For a good dynamic routing algorithm to occur, the 
exchange of network information must be efficient. 
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1.3.2 Optimal Routing 
A desirable routing is associated with a small mean and variance of packet 
delay at each queue. Recall our discussion on the general interconnection network, we 
use figure 4 to represent a general network, which is used to solve for optimal pricing 
strategy later in this thesis, and now we use it to formulate the problem of optimal 
routing as stated in [15". 
Origin for 
r" OD pair Wj 
、+i^/^""^^j^"\^ x„ 
pathm+1 y ^ *m*2l \ ^ path n 
- ^ x ^ ^ ^ ^ / ^ > o _ _ ^ • 
Origin for ^ . ： \ ^ '^^--A / / ^ ^ ^ ^ Destination for 
ODpairw, ^ \ \ ^ ^ \ / Z ODpairw, 
^ ^ ^ \ ^ -
x > x X- A 一 
> < 
Y^ Destination for 
OD pair Wj 
Figure 4: Graph representation o f a network with two OD pairs Wi and w � . 
In [15], the formulation of the optimal routing problem is as follows: 
For each pair w 二 (/, j) of OD pair, the input traffic arrival process is assumed 
stationary with rate r^. The routing objective is to divide each r^ among the many 
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paths from origin to destination in a way that the resulting total link flow pattem 
minimizes the cost function. This problem is formulated in terms of the unknown path 
flows while in our problem of optimal pricing, the problem is formulated in terms of 
the unknown price vector and also the path flows. 
1.4 An Introduction to lntemet Economics 
The growth of the Internet can be explained by its network externalities, and the 
liberal policy of interconnections. [5]. This section will describe briefly Internet 
economics while the rest of the thesis will give an interconnection model for pricing 
mechanism and QoS routing. 
Currently, IPv4 offers a best-effort service only and does not provide any QoS 
guarantee internally. Routers or switches may use priority queuing method to provide 
some kind of QoS assistance for interactive applications. 
While Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) offers several improvements including 
QoS guarantees, economists suggest that the current flat-fee pricing scheme is the real 
culprit for congestion since congestion externalities caused by abused users is not 
penalized. Economists try to develop effective Internet pricing mechanisms, such as 
usage-based pricing while maintaining the benefits of positive network externalities. 
One of the interconnection models for multimedia Internet exchanges has been 
described by [4], which aims at promoting Internet hubbing. 
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1.4.1 Internet Externality 
We may classify Internet externality as three main types: congestion 
externalities, linkage externalities, and network externalities to be defined later. 
We do not need to talk about any economic model when the supply of 
bandwidth far exceeds the demand. From the statistics from the HK main Internet hub 
[2] and the worldwide Internet backbone [3], traffic in the Internet nearly doubles every 
year. New applications such as Video on Demand, Real time Internet telephony, 
streaming video, ICQ and Interactive web content will surely increase the traffic of the 
Internet by a great amount. 
Although Internet technology is also emerging very fast, with upgrades to T3 
links or to more advanced ATM networks, there are times when the demand for 
bandwidth exceeds the supply. The performance of the resource may suffer as a result 
of bandwidth scarcity. A main cause of such a degradation of Quality of Service (QoS) 
may be due to "overuse". Users want to maximize their own utility while ignoring the 
congestion, delay and other costs imposed on other users. Such a negative effect is 
termed congestion externalities. This has also been characterized as a "tragedy of the 
commons" by Garrett Hardin [6:. 
Linkage externalities refer to the economic effect when one user makes a 
connection to the other users. Such an effect may be positive or negative. For example, 
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when one party initiates a talk connection to the other, both parties may benefit from 
such a connection. If one makes a disturbing call to the other party, a negative effect 
results. 
To see the meaning of network externalities, consider the traffic flow of two 
Intemet Hubs as described by [4]. The larger hub can reach a larger number of Intemet 
sites with a lower switching cost and this brings out a benefit to the new users who 
connect to the larger hub. We call this network externalities as the users' benefit 
increases when they can communicate with more users. ‘ 
1.4.2 Current Pricing Practice 
Over the past several years, the speed of the Intemet backbone increases 
dramatically, from the earliest 56Kbps to now 45Mbps. [7] has estimated the 1992 
costs for transporting 1 million bits of data, which is about 122KB，through the 
NSFNET backbone with a comparison to the previous year as shown in table 2. In 
terms of a current commonly used MP3 files of about 4MB，the communication and 
routers cost is about 3 US cents, which is very low. Furthermore, the marginal cost of 
sending a packet, is essentially zero when the communication lines or routers are not 
congested. Then why do we need a pricing mechanism? 
Year Communications Routers Design Throughput 
1960 1.00 2.4 kbps 
1962 m ^ 
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1963 0.42 40.8 kbps 
1964 0.34 50.0 kbps 
1967 0.33 50.0 kbps 
1970 0.168 
1971 0.102 
1974 0.11 0.026 56.0 kbps 
1992 0.00094 0.00007 45 mbps 
Table 2: Communications and Router Costs (Nominal US$ per million bits) 
When congestion occurs, the social costs imposed are paid for by the users of 
the service. They will experience delay of transmission in which they have no way to 
prevent except by waiting. In the current flat fee for connection to the Internet, as long 
as users face a zero price for access, they will continue to overuse the network without 
concerning the congestion externalities they imposed onto others. 
Basically, pricing mechanisms are based on the supply-demand model as shown 
in figure 5. When bandwidth is scarce or when there is congestion, the price should be 
set higher. 
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price supplyof 
bandwidth 
\ demand for 
L 
P*' ^ 
^ number of 
^ packets 
Figure 5: supply and demand model 产 
Traditional pricing models for telephone networks cannot be applied to Internet 
as telephone networks are connection-oriented and use circuit-switching. There are 
fewer issues about congestion，as only blocking can occur and the pricing mechanism is 
simpler. Currently, many proposed pricing mechanisms are proposed and we may 
classify them into one of the three categories: 
1. Flat-fee pricing: Most Internet users pay a fixed amount of monthly fee 
to connect to the Internet regardless of how many bits they send, 
whether they use bandwidth intensive application orjust use their email 
program to send email. 
2. Usage-based pricing: Users pay a fixed cost and a variable cost to 
connect. The fixed cost is the connection charge, which may be zero, 
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while the variable cost is proportional to the number of bit or packet 
they send or receive. It is possible, for example, o use flat-fee pricing 
during off-peak hours and usage-based pricing during peak hours but we 
define the overall system as being usage-based pricing. 
3. Transaction-based pricing: Prices are determined by the characteristics 
of the transaction, such as videoconference or email and depend on the 
number ofbits send or receive. 
There are many literatures, which talk about how to allocate Internet resource. 
David [22] explores issues in the pricing of the Internet, in particular the relationship 
between the range of service actually offered to users and the cost of providing these 
services. In [26] he also talks about proposed congestion pricing schemes allocating 
traffic on the Internet. Kelly [25] also describe a simple charging and accounting 
mechanism for bursty high-priority connections, based on their effective bandwidths. 
[23]，[24] also describe how to price multi-service class networks, like ATM. 
One remarkable proposal is the smart market proposed by Jeffrey [7] for 
setting the price of network access with different priorities. Each packet sets a bid by 
the party receiving the packet which is the highest price he is willing to pay for such 
packet. The router notes the bid attached to each packet and admits all packets with 
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bids greater than some cutoff value. The packets with lower bids will be discarded or 
rerouted to some lower price link. 
While it could be a good idea to price the network by packet level, it has not 
consider the case that Internet is based upon TCP or UDP that a pricing scheme base on 
a connection may be a better choice. [9] has proposed a more practical approach to the 
current Internet pricing scheme which use TCP traffic as a billing criteria. 
1.4.3 Network Interconnection 
The dominant driving economic forces for network interconnection are positive 
network externalities [27]. The network externality is positive when the additional 
person represents a benefit to users while the network extemality is negative if the 
additional user increases the cost. The emergence of Intemet hubs is a good example 
for discussing the network interconnection. Hui [4] describes the size of the Intemet 
hub brings about an extemality, which is the ability to reach a large number of Intemet 
sites efficiently. This extemality in tum attracts more ISPs to connect to the hub, which 
is the driving force for network interconnection. We consider the following simple 
example from [4], which describe the economics of two competing hubs for 
interconnecting N ISPs. Let us assume that each ISP generate an equal amount oftraffic 
A, and this traffic is evenly distributed to the other N-1 ISPs. Suppose a fract ion/ofthe 
iVISPs is connected to the first hub, leave the rest connected to the second hub. 
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fN ISPs with traffic NAf (1 -f)N ISPs with traffic NA(1 -f) 
\ I Interhub t r a f f i c ^ j 
\ / each way \ / 
=NAf ( l - f ) ^ ^ 
„ . . ^ . *• Switch Capacity y * 
~^^~~^^ Switch Capacity =NA(l-f)+ ^ 
= NAf+NAf(l_f) ; i _ l 
y " " ^ \ 
Hub1 Hub2 
Figure 6: Traffic flow for two Internet Hubs 
As seen in figure 6, a traffic volume of NAf is generated by ISPs connected to 
the first hub, out of which a traffic volume of NAf(l-J) is destined for the second hub. 
This inter-hub traffic volume is symmetrical since similarly, a traffic volume of NA(1-
j9/is destined from the second hub to the first hub. Thus the use of two hubs requires an 
inter-hub transmission link which increases cost as shown in table 3. 
Switch Capacity Inter-hub capacity 
Total Per ISP Total Per ISP 
Hub1 NAf(2-f) A(2-f) NAf(1-f) A(1-f) 
Hub2 _ - f 2 ) A(1+f) NAf(1-f) M 
Table 3: Switching and Inter-Hub Link Cost per ISP 
We see readily that the case of two equal size hubs requires a total switching 
capacity of l.5NA, and an inter-hub transmission link of capacity Q.5NA. This is a 
significant increase in cost compared to the case of one hub, which requires a switching 
capacity of NA and no inter-hub link. 
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I f / > 0 . 5 , the first hub acquires a superior externality compared to the second 
hub, if we consider the per subscriber cost of switching and inter-hub transmission at 
each hub as shown in table 3. For the extreme case o f f close to 1, which is close to 
100% dominance, we see that the switching cost per ISP of the second hub is twice that 
of the first hub, and the inter-hub capacity required per ISP is 0 for the first hub versus 
A for the second hub. Based on the economics of network interconnection, we will have 
a detail discussion in the remaining of this thesis. 
1.4 Organization of Thesis 
In Chapter 2，we will start with the review of economics theory for 
interconnection network, which are related to our interconnection models, such as 
demand, cost and game theory. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 are the main chapters in this thesis. 
We will give a discussion about economics models for interconnection models. In 
chapter 3, we shall formulate the problem for the price setting mechanism of the 
Internet interconnection. We modeled the economy of interconnection as a non-
cooperative game among competing network service providers and service users. We 
shall prove the existence of Nash equilibrium on the price setting of the network and 
propose a "Cookbook" procedure for solving the Nash equilibrium for a general 
network. We shall construct simple examples of networks consisting of only parallel 
links or serial links in chapter 4 so as to identify network structures, which produce 
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competitive or collusive pricing practices. Example of price distortion is given in 
chapter 5 and we shall discuss the issue about interconnection policy. Finally, we shall 
have our conclusion in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 2 
Economic Theory for Interconnection Model 
2.1 Introduction 
The growth of the Internet can be explained from the standpoint of 
technological development, public policy, or economics. Internet interconnections 
产 
enable the Internet to grow with the number of applications, number of users, and 
amount of network traffic. We would like to study about the economic nature of the 
network interconnection. In order to facilitate our studies, such as demand, supply, 
market structure, externality, and game theory, we would like to give out a detail 
review of the underlying economic theory. 
We would like to stress that a distinguishing feature of economics is its 
assumption that agents maximize a desired value. A consumer, for example, picks the 
bundle of goods and services that give him the greatest satisfaction. In network 
interconnection, users choose the route base on the shortest path algorithm to minimize 
the cost for connection as well as the congestion suffered. This is called the 
optimization principal. Microeconomics provides a powerful tool for obtaining a 
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clearer picture of the world around us such as how the demand function is derived and 
estimated. 
Besides the optimization principle, there is another so called the equilibrium 
principle in which prices adjust until the amount that people's utility demand is equal 
to the amount that is supplied. In our interconnection models, we shall study the 
optimization principle that the service providers will try to maximize their total revenue 
by adjusting the price of the link that owns. At the same time, the price setting of the 
network will come to an equilibrium state in which no service provider finds it 
beneficial to alter its price. 
This chapter is organized as follows: in section 2.2, we would like to study the 
theory behind demand and supply, in which the consumer behavior and market demand 
will be presented. Next, in section 2.3, we would point out several market structures, 
for example, monopoly, competition and oligopoly. Finally, in section 2.4, a discussion 
about game theory will be given, especially the definition of Nash equilibrium which 
we will use for the analysis of the economic nature of the interconnection models. 
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2.2 Demand and Supply 
2.2.1 ConsumerBehavior 
The economic theory of the consumer assumes that consumers choose the best 
bundle of goods they can afford. So in this subsection, we would like to describe the 
consumer behavior in an economic sense in the following ways: budget constraint, 
preferences and utility. 
The budget constraint describes the term "can afford”. Since' we assume 
consumers prefer more to less, they are always happier consuming larger bundles of 
goods. But in real life, the consumer does not have infinite income and so that the 
consumer cannot have everything that they want. 
We first examine the budge constraint by indicating the consumer's 
consumption bundle by (x^, x � ) . This is simply two numbers that tells us how much the 
consumer is choosing to consume goods 1, x^, and how much for goods 2，x:. We 
assume that for the case of interconnection networks, goods 1 denotes the amount of 
bandwidth purchased and goods 2 denotes the amount of all other things. We further 
denote the price of the two goods be p � a n d p^, and the amount of money the 
consumer has to spend is m . Then the budget constraint of the consumer can be written 
as 
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p^%2 + P2X2 ^ m 
A budget line is the set ofbundles that cost exactly m: 
p^X2 + P2X2 = m 
The budget set is the set of a feasible bundle of goods that the consumer can 




%^ ^ , % 
Budget Set ^ v 
Horizontal intercept = m/p1 x1 
Figure 7: Budge Set 
The slope of the budget line measures the rate at which the market is willing to 
"substitute" goods 1 for goods 2. Sometimes the economists say that the slope of the 
budget line measures the opportunity cost of consuming good 1 since in order to 
consume more of goods 1 you have to give up some consumption ofgoods 2. 
The budget line is subject to change by the change in income or the price of the 
goods. The budget line makes a parallel shift to the northeast with an increase in 
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income as shown in figure 8, while the budget line becomes steeper if good 1 becomes 





m/p1 mVp1 x1 . 




m/p1' m/p1 x1 
Figure 9: Effect n change in price ofone good 
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The budget constraint tells us about how the market influences the feasible 
bundle of good the consumer can purchase. Next we will describe the consumer 
preferences. 
The indifference curve is a starting point in talking about the consumer 
preferences. It demonstrates what is the best bundle of goods the consumer can afford. 
We will also assume the consumption bundle consists of two goods, and let x^  denotes 
the amount of bandwidth consumed and X2 be the amount of the other. We further 
assume that given any two consumption bundles, (x^, X2) and (少”少二)，the consumer 
can determine which bundle is better than the others are or if they are indifference. 
The symbol >- is used to mean that one bundle is strictly preferred to another 
while � m e a n s that the two bundle are indifference to the consumer. Economists 
usually make three assumptions about preferences, which is complete, reflexive and 
transitive. Complete means that two bundles can be compared. Reflexive means that 
any bundle is at least as good as itself. Transitive means that if we think that bundle X 
is at least as good as bundle Y and that bundle Y is at least as good as bundle Z, then 
we thinks that bundle X is at least as good as bundle Z. 
The indifference curve is made up of all combinations of good 1 and good 2 that 
provide equal satisfaction that means all the bundle of good lie on the same indifference 
curve is indifference. The indifference curve is shown in figure 10. 
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x 2 . h ^ L ^ 
x1, 
x1 
Figure 10: Indifference curve: all point on the same indifference curve is o f the same preference. 
For a movement along an indifference curve from point A to point B, the 
consumer gives up x2' of other goods in exchange for xj' of bandwidth without a 
change in satisfaction. When the movement along the indifference curve is 
infinitesimal, the rate of substitution is given by the slope of the tangent to the 
indifference curve at point^. We call the absolute value ofthe slope ofthe indifference 
curve as the marginal rate of substitution of goods 2 to goods 1. 
Economists usually assign a number to every possible consumption bundle such 
that more-preferred bundle get assigned larger numbers than less-preferred bundles. 
This is called a utility function. The consumer's objective is to maximize its utility 
under the budget constraint. This is solved by combining the indifference curve with 
the budget set as shown in figure 11. 
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x2 1 
Optim^N^ \ s ^ 
point \ ^ v ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
x1 
Figure 11: Utility maximization requires reaching the highest attainable indifference curve. 
A commonly used utility function is the Cobb-Douglas utility function 
( \ _ C d 
U\^Y，^2 / — ^\ ^2 
After discussing about the consumer behavior in this section, the utility function 
will be used later to find the demand curve of a product. 
2.2.2 Demand Curve 
In our interconnection model, we shall use the demand function for our analysis. 
In this section, we will provide a theoretical background of how the demand curve is 
derived from the utility function. 
Recall that a utility function is a way of assigning a number to every possible 
consumption bundle such that more-preferred bundles get assigned larger numbers than 
less-preferred bundles. The individual consumer's demand curve is derived from the 
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utility function, while the market demand curve is an aggregation of the various 
individual demand curves. Besides the derivation of the market demand curve, we 
would also discuss about the price elasticity. The price elasticity is a useful measure of 
how responsive the quantity demanded is to price changes and of the effect of price 
changes on the revenue that firms receive. We shall use the price elasticity for the 
analysis of price distortion for a network with a dominant carrier in chapter 5. 
The effect on the price changes to the customer can be classified into two types: 
the income effect and substitution effects. ‘ 
Suppose that for the interconnection model, the customer initially faces prices 
p^ and p2, where p^ is the cost for connection and p : is the cost for other things. His 
money income equals to M” which produces the budget line AB in figure 7. He 
maximizes his utility at point C , purchasing Xj unit of bandwidth and x: unit of other 
things. 
Let us now consider the effects of a fall in the interconnection price while the 
price for other things and money income remind unchanged. If the cost for 
interconnection falls to p^, his budget line rotates outward about the bandwidth-
intercept producing a new budget line AD. The fall in the price of bandwidth has two 
effects. First, the price of food relative to the price of other things falls, which is 
reflected in the budget line becoming flatter. The change in the consumption of 
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bandwidth and other things due to the change in relative prices is the substitution effect. 
The substitution effect can be seen by shifting the new budget line AD inwards and 
tangent to the original indifference curve. This line is represented by HK. We can see 
that the substitution effect for the increase in Xj to x\ and the decrease for X2 to X2. 
Secondly, at the lower price for bandwidth, he can purchase his original bundle of 
bandwidth and other things and still have money left over to purchase more bandwidth 
or other things. The purchasing power of his nominal income M^ has increased, 
making him better off by enabling him to move to a higher indifference curve 1^. The 
change in the consumption of bandwidth and other things as the consumer moves to a 
higher indifference curve is called the income effect. This can be seen from the moving 
of the budget line from HK to AD in which the bandwidth purchase change from x[ 
to x[ and that x: to x^. 
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P2 ^ \ 一 
Other H \ v \ \ ^ 
things 、 、 \ \ X A income 
• x2,, : : : \ £ ^ ^ V ^ ^ 
I * ‘ : = = t l f e ^ •。 
I I I XB \ . K X , D ^ 产 
x1 x1, x1" M1/ M1/ 
" • p1 p1_ 
令 
Bandwidth 
Figure 12: Income and Substitution Effects 
We can see from figure 12 that the overall effect on the decrease in the cost for 
interconnection may increase the purchasing power on other things. Next we will 
derive the individual demand curve and the market demand curve. 
The individual's demand curve shows the relationship between a product's price 
and the quantity of the product he demands. The market demand curve is constructed 
from individual consumer demand curves, which is used to determine the price. To 
determine the demand for bandwidth, one fix the price for other things and vary the 
price for bandwidth, we obtain several optimal demand for the bandwidth. Combining 
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the various price and demand mapping, we obtain the demand curve of the individual 
and it is depicted in figure 13. 
O t h e r t _ ^ ^ V » Price ^ ^ " ^ 
\ \ l ^ v ! x ' ^ p3 P〒: = = J ： ^ ^ > ^ Demand 
\ N k X ^ 3 .P4 | - | n V ^ _ _ ^ curve 
K E x ^ 
B x4 D C E x4 
x1 x2x3 x1 x2x3 ， 
Bandwidth Bandwidth 
Figure 13: Derivation ofdemand curve 
Mathematically, to obtain the demand function from the utility function, we use 
the Lagrange's method. For example, if the utility function for the bandwidth demand 
is of Cobb-Douglas form, we may write it as: 
tl(Xi, X2 ) ~ Xj ^2 
Let us transform the utility function as the form: 
ln w(xj, ^2) = c ln Xj + d ln x: 
The problem to solve for the demand function is: 
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max 二 c ln x^  + d ln x: 
1^ ’巧 
s.t. p^x^ + P2X2 = m 
Now set up the Lagrangian. 
L 二 c l n x^ + d l n x: - ^ { px^ \ + P2^2 ~ 历） 
and differentiate to get the three first-order conditions 
dL c 
—= ^Px 二 0 
OX^  Xj 
dL d . . 
—= 机二0 ， 
CjOC^ JC 2 
dL . 
- = p^x^+p^x^-m = 0 
dl 
Our purpose is to get the demand function of the bandwidth. So by solving the 
above equations, we get 
c m 
Xj = 
c + d p^ 
In this way, we can obtain the demand function from the utility function. 
2.2.3 Price Basticity 
The price elasticity measures how responsive the quantity demanded is to 
various price changes. In our interconnection model, we shall use the elasticity in 
obtaining the price setting strategy or each service provider since they must obtain all 
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the price elasticity from the network for them to set the price, which would then 
optimize their revenue. 
The price elasticity of demand, s , is defined to be the percentage change in 
quantity demanded divided by the percent change in price. A 10 percent increase in 
price is the same percentage increase whether the price is measured in HK dollars or 
US dollars; thus measuring increase in percentage terms make the definition of 
elasticity unit-free. 
Normally，the sign of the elasticity of demand is negative, but we ahvays use the 
absolute value for convenience. If a good has an elasticity of demand greater then 1 in 
absolute value we say that it has an elastic demand. The good has an inelastic demand 
if it has an elasticity of demand less than 1. The elasticity can be used to find out 
whether the revenue would increase if we increase the price. It is shown as follows: 
The revenue can be simply describe as follows: 
R = px 
If we let the price change to p + dp and the quantity change to x + dx, we have 
new revenue of 
K=ij) + dpJx + dx) 
=px + xdp + pdx + dpdx 
The change in revenue is equal to 
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dR 二 xdp + pdx + dpdx 
The last term in the change in revenue can be neglected for small change in 
price and quantity. The rate of change in revenue is equal to 
dR dx 
——二 X + p—— 
dp dp 
= x L ^ ' 
xdp_ 
二4+咖] 
=4i - |办1 
It can be easily seen from the above that the revenue increases when price 
increases if the elasticity of demand is less than 1 in absolute value. Similarly, revenue 
decreases when price increases if the elasticity of demand is greater than 1 in absolute 
value. 
2.2.4 Estimation of Market Demand 
Theoretically, the market demand can be calculated from the utility functions, 
but how do we know about the utility function? In our interconnection model presented 
later in the next chapter, we make assumption about the demand function of the traffic 
as a linear demand function, i.e. 
d = f - ey 
where d is the flow demand, and y is the end-to-end path cost. 
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We need to determine f and e so as to determine the price. An accurate price 
setting strategy is crucial to the survival of the firm. In the previous subsection, we 
know that the choice of the customer depends on his preferences and budget constraint. 
Before we can estimate the demand function of the interconnection model, we 
must decide what variables are appropriate and then gather the data that we will use. In 
our interconnection model, the variables associated with the model should be the price 
settings of the network. We should decide which model should we use, e.g. the linear 
model, Cobb-Douglas model, etc. Afterwards, we use historical data 'such as the 
demand and price setting of the network in the past few year and make a regressions on 
the models to determine the constant term, e.g. the e and / . This completes the 
demand function determination. 
Currently there does not exist a method to accurately determine the demand 
function of the market. One must use statistical theory to determine the demand 
function with an acceptable confidence level. For simplicity, our interconnection model 
will use linear demand function. 
2.3 Market Structure 
In this section, we briefly describe some form of market structure to supplement 
that discussed in the previous chapters. We talk about the competitive firm, monopoly 
and oligopoly. 
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2.3.1 Competitive Firm 
As recalled from the economic theory, price and output are determined at the 
intersection of the industry supply and demand curves as show in figure 14: 
price/ 
cost I demand(price) supply(cost) 
- t ^ . I 
X* quantity 
Figure 14: Market equilibrium 
In a competitive industry, price and output are determined at the intersection of 
the industry supply and demand curves. Each firm is a price taker, because no firm 
feels that its price setting decision can increase its profit. Further extending the 
competitive model, government may take some action in controlling the price, such as 
by affecting licensing fees，tariffs and price control. 
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2.3.2 Monopoly 
The market structure is called a monopoly when there is only one firm 
dominating in the industry. A monopolist operates at a point where the price is higher 
than that of the competitive case. 
2.3.3 Oligopoly 
When there are only a few sellers, this form of market structure is called 
oligopoly and poses some interesting economic problems for its managers. When one 
firm decides its choices for prices and quantities it may already know the choices made 
by the other firm. We call it the price leader when the firm gets to set its price before 
the other firm, while the others are called a price follower. The strategic interactions in 
these cases form a sequential game. If they both set the price simultaneously, we shall 
call this a simultaneous game. 
Game theory is very good in explaining such kinds of interaction and in the case 
for our interconnection theory. We shall look more closely at game theory in the next 
section. 
2.4 Game Theory 
Game theory [31] is a branch of modem applied mathematics that analyzes 
various problems of conflict between parties that have similar different interests. And 
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The previous section on oligopoly theory shows an example of economic theory of 
strategic interaction among firms. In this thesis, we shall use extensively the term Nash 
equilibrium for various solutions. So in this subsection, we would like to give out a 
brief framework of game theory. 
2.4.1 The Payoff Matrix of a game 
A game can be described by indicating the payoffs to each of the players for 
each configuration of strategic choices they make. Suppose that two people are playing 
a simple game with the payoff matrix as shown in table 4 
Player B 
Head Tail 
PlayerA Head 2,4 0,2 
Tail 4’2 2,0 
Table 4: A payoff matrix of a game 
Each player can choose head or tail independently without knowing the other's 
choice. The payoff matrix of the game, which is shown above, will determine their 
payoff. For example, if player A choose head while player B choose head, player A will 
get a payoff of 2 and player B will get 4. These strategies could represent economic 
choices like "raise price" or "lower price." 
Let's consider the best strategies of each player. Player A's best strategy is to 
choose tail as it give him a minimum of 2 as the payoff, while player B's best strategy 
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is to choose head as it give him also a minimum of 2 as the payoff. Thus we would 
expect that the equilibrium strategy is for A to choose tail and player B to choose head. 
This strategy is called a dominant strategy, as there is one optimal choice of strategy for 
each player no matter what the other player does. 
2.4.2 Nash Equilibrium 
We do not always have dominant strategy as it can be seen in table 5. In this 
game, there is no dominant strategy for each player and each player's optimal strategy 
depends on the strategy of the other player. When player A chooses head，player B 
chooses head, when player A chooses tail, player B chooses tail. 
Player B 
Head Tail 
PlayerA Head 4,2 0,0 
Tail 0,0 2’4 
Table 5: Nash equilibrium 
Instead of requiring A's choice be optimal for all choices of B, we can just 
require that it be optimal for the optimal choices of B, assuming B chooses its optimal 
strategy. Nash equilibrium is a set of choices for which each player's choice is optimal, 
given the choices of the other players. So Head-Head and Tail-Tail are Nash 
equilibrium point. For if player A chooses head, player B's optimal strategy is to 
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choose head, while if player B chooses head, the optimal strategy for A is to choose 
head. The reason for the point Tail-Tail is also similar. 
On the other hand, there are games that have no Nash equilibrium at all. For 




PlayerA Head 0,Q 0,-1 
Tail 1,0 -1,3 
Table 6: A game with no Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) 
We shall have a more in depth discussion about Nash equilibrium when we 
study the economic theory of network interconnection later in this thesis. 
2.4.3 Mixed Strategies 
In the previous subsection, each player is making one choice and stick to it. This 
is called a pure strategy. If we allow the players to assign probability to each choice and 
to play their choices according to those probabilities, this kind of strategy is called a 
mixed strategy. 
So, Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies means that each player assigns an 
optimal probability to each choice. Also note that Nash equilibrium always exists in 
mixed strategies. 
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2.4.4 Existence of Nash Equilibrium 
In our interconnection model presented later in the thesis, we shall prove the 
existence of Nash equilibrium for the price settings in a network. We model the 
interconnection network as a n-person games. Rosen [29] has proven the existence of 
equilibrium points for concave n-person games. This theorem is very useful in our 
analysis, so we give out this theorem in this subsection. 
Theorem 2.1: An equilibrium point exists for every concave n-person game. 
Proof: 
See Rosen [29] Theorem 1. 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have studies several economic theories, which could apply to 
our interconnection models later in the thesis. This includes how to determine the 
demand functions, how the service provider interacts to form several well-known 
market structures. We also study the game theory and Nash equilibrium. Finally, we 
give out the theorem concerning the existence ofNash equilibrium. 
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Problem Formulation Interconnection 
Network for Pricing and Routing in 
Internet 
3.1 Introduction 
With the emergence of Intemet hubs as strategic facilities for economic 
development [4], we would like to extend the paper [4] and focus on the economics 
models of network interconnections. While there are many discussions on pricing and 
policy [13], few of them analyze in detail such models. 
We consider a communication network owned by several service providers. 
Each service provider will charge rental prices for the links they own for 
interconnection. Each service provider wants to maximize its revenue, giving rise to an 
n-stage non-cooperative game. We assume traffic chooses the least costly connection 
for end-to-end delivery. At each stage, service providers set the price of links they own 
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based on price reaction curves with the information of the previous price setting of their 
competitors. Mathematically, the service provider's price reaction curve is a function of 
their competitors' price set in the last stage. At equilibrium, no carrier wants to shift 
from the optimal point, as any shifting will make him worse off. We want to investigate 
the Nash equilibrium of such system. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we shall give out the detail 
problem formulation of the general interconnection network. In section 3, we will prove 
the existence of Nash equilibrium under reasonable concavity condition. In section 4, 
we will give out a "cookbook" procedure for testing and finding the Nash equilibrium 
of the general network. Lastly in section 5, we will give out two examples to show the 
"cookbook" procedure. 
3.2 Problem Formulation 
We consider a network consists of a graph G = {N,L) where N is the set of nodes 
n (where switches and routers are placed for interconnections) and links 1 = (i, j) in the 
set of links L (where iJ&N). To formulate the problem of optimal price setting, each 
link 1 is assigned ownership m, which is in the set M of service providers. Each service 
provider m owns a set of links Lm- Each service provider is interested in maximizing 
revenue, which is the product of price pi of link 1 and flow demand x! of link 1, summed 
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over all links 1 in Lm. Moreover, for each pair w = (i, j) of distinct nodes i and j (also 
referred to as an origin-destination (or OD) pair), the input traffic arrival process is 
assumed to be with rate r^ ^ which is depended on the total cost of the path w. This is 
also called the demand function. We may also consider modeling multiple priority 
classes of users by allowing several OD pairs to have the same origin and destination 
nodes. Thus r^^ is the arrival rate of traffic entering the network at node i and destined 
for node j . More precisely, denote 
^ = Set ofall OD pairs ‘ 
P^ = Set of all directed paths connecting the OD pair w 
N = Set of nodes • 
L 二 Set of links 
M = Set of service providers 
Lm = Set of links 1 e L owned by service provider m e M 
Xp = Flow (data units/sec) of path p 
Pi = Price of the link 1 € L set by the service provider 
Then the collection of all path flows {x^  | p e P^,we w] must satisfy the 
constraints 
^ x ^ = r^ , for all w e W 
p^p. 
x ^ > 0 , for all peP^,weW 
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Figure 15 shows a graph representation of a network with two OD pairs wi and 
W2. The paths of the OD pairs are 户巧={l,2,...m} and P^ ^ ={m + l,w + 2,. . ."}. The 
traffic inputs r^i and iw2 are to be divided into the path flows xi, ... Xm and Xm+i,... Xn, 
respectively. The total flow F/ of link / is the sum of all path flows traversing the link 
Fi= 2 X , 
all paths p 
containing / 
Origin for 
r^ OD palrWj 
*m.1 / Y \ ^ *n 
path m+1 y^ *m+2 1 \ ^ path n 
-^V:<-^k:>~~~~~~~A J ^•^•"^• 
Origin for \ \ : \ ^ ^ ^ - A / ^^x-"^^ Destination for 
OD pairw^  ^^^^ \ ^ ^ ^ \ / ^ ^ OD pairw^  
^ ^ ~ ~ v ^ : m 
x \ -^ X 一 
^ x 
V^ Destination for 
^ OD pair w^  
Figure 15: Graph representation o f a network with two OD pairs Wi and W2. 
Further, the cost per unit traffic y/ for a link 1, which is the total of the price pi 
and the quality of service degradation cost Q(Fi) of link 1 is given by 
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yi =Pi+Ci[Fi) 
f \ 
= Pi+Ci 2X 
all path p 
V^containing 1 J 
Then, the total cost Yp of path p is given by 
Yp = 》 , 
all link 1 
on path p 
- / \ " 
= E A + Q Y,^p 
all link 1 all path p , 
on path p � c o n t a i n i n g / ) _ 
Finally the cost /)^ of the OD pair w is the minimum Yp of all the paths p e P^. 
For an end-to-end traffic demand using more than one path, the cost ofthese paths must 
be the same, or else traffic could be shifted from the more costly path to the least costly 
path. The flow Xp of the path in which the cost is higher than other path is equal to 0. 
There are two fundamental problems in this network: A routing problem and a 
price setting problem. From the users' point of view, they would choose the amount of 
traffic they need, which is 厂冰 and the path which minimize the cost they faced, which is 
Xp. It is a classical routing problem. 
On the other hand, the problem facing the service provider is more complicate. 
In terms of the unknown path flow vector x = {x^  | p e P^,we w ] and price vector 
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Pm = {pi | / e Z " J of service provider m, the objective of the service provider m is 
written as 
maximize ^ P i F j 
P' • „ 
subject to ^ x ^ = r^ , for all w e W 
p^p. 
7 = i ) ^ = ^ x > 0 
P P ， f o r all peP^,weW 
7 , > D , = > x ^ = 0 ' “ 
where D^ = min7^ , for all p e P^, w e W 
Note that we have included the Kuhn-Tucker condition that if the cost of the path 
is higher than the minimum cost of all paths, the flow of that particular path will be 
zero, i.e. 7^ > D^ => x^ = 0. We are interested not only in finding out the optimal price 
setting strategy of the service providers, but also the possibility of the existence of 
equilibrium of the network price and its stability. 
Precisely, each service provider will find the price reaction curve of each link he 
owns base on the objective function above. The price reaction curve is the price setting 
function of the service provider in terms of the price setting of its competitors in the last 
stage, which is found by evaluating the saddle point of the service provider's objective 
function. We model the price setting mechanism as an n-stage game. At each stage, the 
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price of each link is set according to the price reaction curve and the price signal of all 
other link in the last stage. We assume the service provider can obtain the price setting 
of other links in the previous stage. We have \L\ links and |Z| price reaction curve. At 
equilibrium, if such exists, the price of each link will converge to an equilibrium price. 
We are interested in finding the equilibrium price and the optimum flows of the 
network. 
3.2 Existence of NEP Interconnection Network 
We assume that each service provider does not cooperate with each other in 
setting up the price of the communication link. Each provider's main objective is to 
maximize its total revenue. The total cost of a path from the source to the destination 
depends on the prices of the link p[ and the congestion externalities of the link Q (F]), 
which depends on the flow F! of link 1. We assume that the price of the link and the 
congestion externalities are independent variable. Each OD-pair of the network has a 
throughput demand r^, which is some ergodic process depending on the cost of the 
path and can be found by consulting the supply and demand model of figure 16. 
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\ demand for 
\ bandwidth 
p . h v 
『w number of 
packets / sec 
Figure 16: supply and demand curve 
The demand r^ is split through the communication paths i V We denote by x^ 
be the flow rate of path p so that ^^^^ x^ == ” 拟 . E a c h path has a total end-to-end cost of 
- / \" 
Yp = ^ Pi + C, ^ x ^ , and assume that min(7^)=7. At the beginning of each 
all link / all path p 
on path p y containing 1 y 
Stage, service provider m is able to decide the price pj V/ e L^ of the links it owns as 
long as Pi > 0 (nonnegativity constraint). The system price configuration, denoted by 
p is the vector p = 0^,J^2,...,Pz_), where Pi e [0,oo) V/ e L. The system flow 
configuration F = {F^,F2,...,F^) depends on the system price configuration. The 
revenue o f a link 1 is given by ;;/F/(p). To ease our notation, we define P c [0,oo)^ be 
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the set containing all possible p and that P, c [0,co) be the set containing all possible 
Pi' 
The performance measure of a service provider m e M is given by a revenue 
fUnction J^(p) . The aim of each service provider is to maximize its revenue. Since the 
revenue function depends on the system price configuration, it tums out that the 
optimal decision of each service provider depends on the decisions made by other 
service providers, and we are faced with a noncooperative game. Thus we ^ e interested 
in the Nash solution of the game as well as its uniqueness and properties. In other 
words, we seek a system price configuration such that no service provider finds it 
beneficial to change the links' price it owns. Formally, a feasible system price 
configuration p' = {p^ ‘, p^ ’，..., Pi') is a Nash equilibrium point ^SfEP) if, for all m e M 
and / e L^, the following condition holds: 
J " ( p ’ ) = r " ( jV , . . . , iV i ' , jV ,J^ /+ i，，...,J^L ' ) = mq5/"OV,... ,P/- i'， i^/ ,J^/+i’，...,Pz/) 
P/e、J、 
The above condition states that at the Nash equilibrium point, the optimization 
solution of each service provider is indeed the same Nash equilibrium point. Jn a 
practical scenario, a service provider changes the price of the links it owns repeatedly, 
in response to the strategy of the other service providers in the previous stage. The 
stability points of such systems are exactly those in which no service provider finds it 
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beneficial to change the price of the links, i.e., the NEPs. An interesting question is 
whether the system indeed converges to an NEP. 
Before we give out the prove for the existence of Nash equilibrium point, we 
take the following fundamental assumptions about the network. 
Assumption 1: The price of the link p[ and the congestion externalities Ci {Fi) 
are independent variable. 
Assumption 2: C^  (F^) is a non-negative function of the flow of the link only 
and that C^  {F^) is increasing with F；. 
Assumption 3: The flow of the link depends on the cost of the path, which in 
tum depends on the price of the link and the externalities of the link. 
Assumption 4: J^ (p) is the sum of link revenue functions which are owned by 
service provider m, i.e., J ^ (p) = ^^^^ J ^ (p). Each J � ( p ) satisfies 
J^ (P): [0,oo)^ ~> [0,co] and is defined to be p^Fi (p) which depends on the price of the 
link only. 
We point out that assumption 2 encompasses a large family of interesting cost 
functions. In particular, the assumption 2 states that the cost function of the link does 
not depends on the flow of other links and that we are only interested in the congestion 
externalities of the network but not the network externalities. 
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On the other hand, we shall consider the demand functions that comply with the 
following assumptions: 
Assumption 5: r^ is a non-negative function depending on the cost, which is 
the sum of the price and the congestion externality, of the path only. Further, r^ is 
decreasing with Y . 
We point out that assumption 5 also encompasses a large family of interesting 
demand functions. In particular, the assumption 5 states that traffic will tend to choose 
the least costly path for delivery, which is the shortest path algorithm. In equilibrium, 
paths with non-zero flow will cost equal, which is the minimum of all the path cost. 
In order to prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium point, we require that 
the revenue function J^ (p ) to be concave in Pi, V/ e L^ and that, J ^ ( p ) is 
continuously differentiable in p! V/ G L^ . 
To show the concavity of the revenue function J^ (p), we would like to use the 
following well-known theorems from [13:. 
Theorem 3.1: Let / ( x ) be a twice differentiable function on the open convex set 
X ¢= E". Then f{x) is concave on X if and only if the Hessian matrix H(x) is 
negative semidefinite for every x e X. 
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Theorem 3.2: (Sylvester's Theorem) A quadratic form x^Hx is negative semidefinite 
ifand only ifall the successive principal minors of the matrix - H are non-negative. 
We are interested in how the convexity of cost and demand functions will affect 
the concavity of the revenue functions. A special kind of cost function and demand 
function is that which corresponds to linear cost and demand function. In other words, 
suppose that: 
Assumption 6: Q(i^/) = c,F/, where c, is a constant, is a cost function follows 
assumption 2. We shall refer this as type-A function. 
Assumption 7: r^ 二 f-eY, where f and e are constant, is a demand function 
follows assumption 5. We shall refer this as type-B function. 
Under the above assumptions, the non-cooperative game is equivalent to a 
concave game in the sense of [29], and thus the existence of an NEP is guaranteed 
(Theorem 1 in [29]). Since some semantic differences do exist, we briefly outline the 
proof. A similar proof on the routing game is also introduced in [19:. 
Theorem 3.3: Consider a general network G = {N, L) with continuous revenue 
functions J ^ ( p ) , which are concave and continuously differentiable in p/ V/ e L^, an 
NEP is guarantee to exist. 
Proof: 
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First is some notation to clarify, J ^ ( p ) is the revenue function of service 
provider m, which is the sum of all link revenue function J^ (p): [0, co)^  — [0,co], i.e. 
j m { p ) = X e L J ? (p) • The link revenue function is defined to be /7^F^(p) where p is 
the price vector of the network p = {px^Pi^'-^Pi)^ which is the set of price charge by 
all the service providers. 
Consider the point-to-set mapping p e P ~> P(p) c P , defined by 
广 、 
r ( p ) = j p ' G P : p / G a r g m a x y ^ O ^ i , . . . , ^ / , . . . , j ^ J V / G Z ^ , V w G M > 
L g/eP| J 
P is a set of all possible system price vectors, but not all are optimized price 
vector. We use a mapping r，which indeed are the price reaction curves of the service 
providers, to map the set of all possible system price vectors P into a subset that 
contains only optimized system price vectors. Specifically, 
arg maxJ^ {p^,..., g^,...，p^ ) is the set of price of link 1 which optimized the revenue 
g/ePi 
function J " ( p ) . 
Then F is an upper semicontinuous mapping (by the continuity assumption) 
which maps each point of the convex compact set P into a closed convex subset of P . 
Then by the Kakutani fixed point theorem there exists a fixed point p e r(p)，and such 
a point is easily seen to be a Nash equilibrium. That is for all m e M and 1 e L^, 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - 5 2 -
Chapter 2 Problem Formulation Interconnection Network 
for Pricing and Routing in Internet 
J ^ " ( p ’ ) = J " 0 9 i ' , . . .， i 7 m _ i , , ; 7 ^ , p ^ + i ’, . . .， j ^ ^ ' ) = m a ^ J " O ^ i , , . . . , ; 7 ^ _ / , p , , ; 7 ^ + / , . " , / 7 M ’ ) 
j"n,eyt+ 
Since at equilibrium, no service provider is willing to change the price of the 
link without make it worse off. 
Q.E.D. 
In the next subsection, we will give out a "cookbook" procedure for testing and 
finding the NEP of the general network. 
3.3 A "Cookbook" Procedure 
Here we present a cookbook procedure for solving for the equilibrium of the 
price setting strategy. 
At the first step in the procedure for solving this problem, we obtain a graph 
representation of the network. The network contains the set (or subset) of OD pairs W, 
the set (or subset) of paths F^, the set of nodes N, the set of links L, the set of owners 
M, and the set of link-owner relationships Lm- We use this information to compute the 
flow of each link Fi in terms of path flow Xp. Also compute the link cost yi and the path 
cost Yp. 
Secondly, evaluate the equilibrium path flows Xp in terms of the price pi subject 
to the constraint that paths cost must be equal or flows will be diverted to another path 
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with lower cost. Also we must be aware that the total paths flow should be equal to the 
flow injected for the OD pair Vy^  i.e. to find all x^ (p). 
At the third step, we can obtain the revenue functions J ^ ( p ) of each service 
provider and use the Sylvester's Theorem to test the concavity of the revenue functions. 
After successfully check the existence of NEP of the network, we evaluate the 
marginal effect of the path flow with respect to the price pi. i.Q.dXp|dpi for all 
p G P^,we W,l e L in the fourth step. 产 
At the fifth step, using the objective function of each owner, we can find out the 
first order condition for this function and obtain the price reaction curve of each link. 
Lastly, we got |Z| price reaction curve and |Z| unknown price, we can then 
compute the equilibrium price for each link pi as well as the equilibrium path flow Xp. 
3.4 Cookbook Examples 
Now we here demonstrate two cookbook examples to see when it successfully 
fmds out the equilibrium price setting and when it fails. The results motivate us to find 
out the conditions in which the network has an equilibrium solution� 
For the first example, consider the network as shown in figure 17. We first 
denote the network with the following terms: 
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" 2 , 3 = { ( U ( A , / J 
M = {wj,m2} 
A = { A , U 
L2={h] 
^1 = ^ ) ' ^ 2 =1(/2,/3),^3 二1(/3),工4 =X(/i,/J 
面 
" i L ； ^ n, 
^ 丨1 ^ 
*i 
Figure 17: A general network example, (3 links, 2 OD pairs, 2 owners, 4 paths) 
Secondly, the flow and cost of the links and the paths are respectively: 
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F\ 二 Xi + X4 
F 2 = X 2 
F3 == x: + X3 






^ 4 = > ^ l + ; ^ 2 
Note that we here assume linear congestion externality for the ease of 
calculation. Later we will derive the case for general congestion externality function. 
Next，we evaluate the equilibrium flow of each paths in terms of the price of the 
links assuming that at equilibrium, the cost of each paths are equal for the same OD 
pair or else flow will shift to the lease costly path. Also the total flow of the path must 
be equal to the total traffic in the network, i.e. 
7l=J^ 2 
Y, =Y, 
3 一 ；……(2.) 
^1 + ^2 _ J\ 
^3 + ^4 = fl 
And the equilibrium flow of each path is found to be: 
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x i = / i + l 
Cl 
. - _ E ^ 
J^ 2 — 
2^ (3) 
工 _ g 3 / ^ 2 + ^ l f e ( / l + / 2 ) + i ^ 2 ) + ^ 2 u - 内 ) 
3 C 2 ( q + C 3 ) 
乂 一 -c^Vi -q(C2/1+i^2)+q(C3/2 -Pi +P3) 
4 C2(C1+C3) 
We have to include the Kuhn Tucker condition that if the cost of the path is 
unequal, the flow of the most costly path will become zero. Here we note-that the flow 
of path 2 must equal to 0 as p2, c2 must be non-negative and that the flow of each path 
must be greater than or equal to zero. 
Next, we have to check if the revenue function fulfill Sylvester's Theorem. We 
obtain the revenue functions of the two service providers as: 
,1 -Pl , ^ f . , Pi I -^3P2 -^1(^2/1 +P2) + C2{^3f2 -Px +;^3)l 
J = + A / 1 + — + 7 ~ " - ~ ~ \ 
C2 V ^2 C2(q+C3) J 
j2 一 „ ( - P i , ^ 3 ; ^ 2 + ^ 1 ( ^ 2 ( / 1 + / 2 ) + / ^ 2 ) + ^ 2 U - p ^ y 
J — Pz ’ 7 \ 
V ^2 ^2{^l+^3) J 
The revenue functions of the service providers are well defined only when the 
flow and the price of the links are non-negative, i.e. from (3) 
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/ i + l ^ 
C! 
- ^ > 0 
C! 
C,p^  + C^i (^ 2 (/l + /2 ) + Pl ) + ^ 2 (;^ 1 -朽）20 
- c , P 2 - c, { c J , + p ^ ) + C: (C3/2 - p , + p , ) > 0 
Ip,Pl ^ 0 
The Hessian matrixes of the two revenue functions are: 
- 丄 o " 
H[-J']= C1+C3 
0 ！ 
_ 〔 2 」 
H [ - J ' ] J ^ -
LC1+C3_ 
Applying Sylvester's Theorem, the two Hessian matrixes are positive 
semidefinite and so the two revenue functions are concave in the price of the links, 
where the owner owns. NEP is guarantee to exist. 
Recall the objective function of the price setting problem: 
maximize ^ P i F j (4.) 
P' ai1/e4, 
From (1) and (4), we may then write the two objective functions of the two 
owners as: 
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maximize p^ {x^  + X4)+p^ fe) 
PhPi 
and (5.) 
maximize p^ {xj + X3) 
P3 
The first order condition of (5) must satisfied: 




a [p3 (X2+X3) ] = 0 产 
郎3 
From (3), (6) and rearranging terms, we get the price reaction curve of each 
owner: 
P l = | f c ( / l + / 2 ) + A ) 
P 2 = 0 … … ( 7 . ) 
P3 = | ( ^ l ( / l + / 2 ) + A ) 
Note that p2 = 0 match our guess for the flow of path 2 equal 0. At each stage, 
the owner of the links set the price for the links according to the price reaction curve of 
each link base on the information about the price of other links in the previous stage. At 
equilibrium，the price of each link will not be deviated and are found by solving the 
three price reaction curve: 
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Px =|(c!+2c3)(/i+/2) 
j ^ 2 = 0 ……（8 . ) 
; 7 3 = | ( 2 C i + C 3 ) ( / i + / 2 ) 
From (3) and (8)，the optimal flow of traffic is computed as: 
^1 = / i 
X2 = 0 
(2c,y3)(/.|/.) … … ( 9 . ) 
3 3 ( q + C 3 ) 产 
- ( 2 q + C 3 ) / , + ( q + 2 C 3 ) / , 
" 4 = J ^ ^ 
And that the cost of each path and link as well as the constraints of (2) can be 
calculated and verified easily. And the interpretation of this result is that, traffic of any 
OD pair will be traversed through the links h and l3 exclusively and that link 2 will just 
be used may be in case oflink fails. 
For the second example as shown in figure 18, there is only 1 OD pair and can 
be denoted as follows: 
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N = {n^,n^,n^,n^} 
L - {A, h，h, h, h } 
W = ^n^,n^)} 
P i , 4 = f c , U ( Z 2 " 4 ) , ( / i , V 3 ) } 
( 、 
M=={m1 ,m2} 
L\ = { ^ , h，h} 
L! - {j-2，h} 
^1 = ^ , / 3 ) ' ^ 2 = ^ , / 4 ) ' ^ 3 二 i M ) 
庭 
. _ 
Figure 18: Another general network problem, (5 links, 1 OD pair, 2 owners, 3 paths) 
Secondly, the flow and cost of the links and the paths are shown below. As 
before, linear congestion externality is assumed and that the congestion parameter c/ is 
assumed to be equal for all links for ease of interpretation: 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - 6 1 -
Chapter 2 Problem Formulation Interconnection Network 
for Pricing and Routing in Internet 




F 5 = X 3 
少1 =Pi+cF] 
y i = P i + c K ^ ……(10.) 
少3 =P3+cFs 





The equilibrium path flows must satisfied the following constraint: 
y.=Y2 
^ W 3 ……（11.) 
X^ + ^2 + X^ 二 f 
And the equilibrium paths flow this time are found to be: 
_ 2cf^p, —P2 -3p,+3p, ^4p, 
、 = 4^ 
2cf^p,-p,^p,-p, …… 
2 4c 
_-pl^p2^p3-PA-^p5 x^ 一 
‘ lc 
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Next is to check the concavity of the revenue functions, the revenue functions is 
shown in the following: 
,1 2cf{j), + p,)-{p, -p,){px -Pi +Pz -P,)-^{Px -Pi -P3 +P4)P5 -^P] J 二 — 
4c 
,2 2c/Q7, +P^)+<^2 -Pz)iPx -Pl +^3 -PA) 
J ^ ^ 
Again this time, the revenue functions of the two service providers is well-
defined only if the flow and the price of the links are non-negative, i.e. from (12) 
2 c / + A - ; ^ 2 - 3 ; ? 3 + 3 ; ? 4 + 4 j ^ 5 > 0 
2cf + p^-p^^p^-p^>0 
-p,+p2+p^-p,-2p,>^ 
Xp,Pi ^ 0 
The Hessian Matrix of the two revenue functions are: 
-丄 z l J_' 
2c 2c 2c 
i / [ - J ^ ] = ^ 丄 丄 
2c 2c 2c 
丄丄 1 
_2c 2c c _ 
-丄 z l " 
H[-J']= 2c 2c 
L —丄 1 
_2c 2c_ 
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Applying Sylvester's Theorem, the two Hessian matrixes are not positive 
semidefinite and so the two revenue functions are not concave in the price of the links, 
where the owner owns. NEP is not guaranteed to exist. 
Returning for the solution of the network, although existence of NEP is not 
guarantee, we may still try to solve it and write the two objective functions facing the 
two owners as: 
maximize p^ (xj + X3)+p^ {xj)+p^ (x3) 
PhPX'Ps 
and ……（13.) ‘ 
maximize P2 {x2)+p^ (x^  + X3) 
P2,P3 . 
And the first order condition of (13) must satisfied: 
^ k (^ i + X3 )+P4 ( ^ 2 ) + P 5 (^3) ] 二 Q 
^Pi 
3 | i ^ 2 f e ) + ; ^ 3 ( X 1 + X 3 ) ] = 0 
^P2 
^ [ P 2 f e ) + ; ^ 3 ( ^ 1 + ^ 3 ) ] ^ Q ( 1 4 ) 
郎3 
a[pi {x, + x,)+p, {x^)+p, (x3)] 二� 
机 
a[pi{x, + x,)+p,{x^)+Ps(X3)] 二 Q 
^Ps 
From (12), (14) and rearranging terms, we get the price reaction curve of each 
link: 
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r Pl P3 
P i = q / ^ + Y - y + A - A 
P 2 = c f ^ f ^ P s - f 
P s = c f - ^ ^ P , ^ ^ ……(15.) 
p, V. 
P,=cf + P , - ^ + ^ - p , 
Ps =^{-P1+P2+P3-P4) 
At each stage, the owner of the links set the price for the links according 0 the 
price reaction curve of each link base on the information about the price of other links 
in the previous stage. But this time the five price reaction curve of (15) will give no 
solution to the equilibrium price setting. 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have proved the existence of Nash equlibrium of the 
interconnection network and developed a "Cookbook" procedure to find the 
equilibrium solution of the price competition. We have shown that concavity of the 
revenue functions are sufficient for a NEP to exist but it is not necessary. In chapter 4 
and 5, we will give out some simple example to show some special case of equlibrium. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In chapter 3, we have shown the existence ofNash equilibrium of interconnection 
model under the some concavity assumption on the revenue ftinction of the service 
providers. In this chapter and the chapter that follows, we will construct some simple 
examples the interconnection models. This chapter will deal with the case for 
interconnection networks consist of only parallel links or serial links. We will show that 
parallel network promote competition while serial network promote monopoly. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we shall first examine the 
competitive pricing of parallel networks. In section 3, we look at the serial network. In 
section 4, we draw simple conclusions from these models. 
4.2 Competitive Pricing of Parallel Networks 
The first part of our discussion focuses on the competitive pricing of parallel 
networks. We want to show that parallel network promote competition. 
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4.2.1 Model and Problem Formulation 
We are given a s e t M = { 1, 2, ..., M } of service providers, which own a set of 
parallel communication links L 二 { 1, 2, ..., L } interconnecting a common source node 
to a common destination node as shown in figure 19. We assume that the number of 
service providers is smaller than the number of links and that each link can be owned 
by at most one service provider. We also let L^ be the set of link 1 e L owned by 
service provider m e M. 
destination 
/ f f ^ 
link 1 link n 
( P l , X i , C i ) ( - “ “ “ " I QPn' \ ' ^n) 
V w 
source 
Figure 19: parallel network 
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4.2.2 Existence of Nash Equilibrium Point 
Recall that for a network to have Nash equilibrium, the revenue function o f the 
service provider need to be concave in the link price it owns. We then give out the 
following Lemma for the validity of the concavity of Jf (p). 
Lemma 4.1: The revenue functions J^(p) of a network consist ofparallel links, with 
linear cost and demand functions are concave in p, V/ e L^,. 
We give out the following simple example to show the concavity of the revenue 
function J^(p). 
Consider a parallel network with 2 links owned by different owner, the cost 
function ofthe links are oftype-A while the demand function of the links are of type-B, 
we then obtain the following equations: 
>^i =Pi +^1^1 
^2 =P2+^2^2 
Xj + Xj == d 
d = f-ey 
At equilibrium, the path cost the network is equal or else the traffic will shift to 
the least costly path, i.e., y^ = yj = y and the equilibrium path flows are found to be: 
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-p,+c^{f-ep,) + p^ 
^1 = 
c^ +^2 +c^c^e 
-P2+c,{f-ep^) + p, 
^2 = 
c^ +Cj +c^c^e 
And the revenue functions J^ (p) of each service providers are: 
ji ^Px{-Pi+C2{f-^Px)+P2) 
Cj +C2 +c^c^e 
j2 ^P2{-P2^^l[f-^Pl) + Pl) 
Cj +C2 +C j^2^ 
The condition for which the revenue functions are well-defined is: 
- A + ^ 2 ( / - ^ P 1 ) + i ^ 2 ^ O 
-P2^<^i{f-^Pi)+Px 20 
Xp,PilQ 
Since we require the concavity of the revenue function to be depended only on 
the price for the links owned by the service provider, to obtain the Hessian matrix, we 
only need to differentiate the revenue fuQction by the price two times. It is found to be: 
外/)= 2(l + cJg 
dp^ Cj +C2 +0^C26 
a'(-j')_ 2{1+c,)e 
dpl q + ^ 2 +^1^2^ 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - 6 9 -
Chapter 4 Price Competition for Interconnection Models 
Since the Hessian matrix of the negative of the revenue functions J^ (p) are 
positive semidefinite except when e 二 0 (inelastic demand), we conclude that J ^ ( p ) is 
concave in pi V/ e L^ . 
For a network with 3 links owned by 3 different owners, the Hessian matrix of 
the negative of the revenue functions J^ (p) are: 
d^J^ _ 2(c2 +C3 +^2^3^ ) 
dpl C2C3 + q (c2 + C3 + C2C^e) 
d^J^ _ 2(c1 +C3 +c^c^e) ‘ 
dpl Cj C3 + Cj (cj + C3 + Cj c^e) 
d^J^ _ 2{c2 + q +C2C^e) 
dp] C2C1 + C3 (c2 + Cj + C2C^e) 
The Hessian matrix is positive for e > 0 • It can be shown that for a network of 3 
links or above, concavity is guarantee no matter the demand is elastic or inelastic. 
Given that we have method to show the concavity of the revenue function 
jm (p), we now give out the following theorem for the existence of a NEP. 
Theorem 4.2: Consider a network of parallel links with continuous revenue functions 
J ^ ( p ) , which are concave and continuously differentiable in p^ V/ e L^, an NEP is 
guarantee to exist. 
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Given that, there exist an equilibrium for a network consists of parallel links, we 
would like to give out some numerical example to study its properties in the following 
section. 
4.2.3 Numerical Example and Properties 
Upon knowing about the existence of NEP under certain concavity condition, 
we now present a numerical example for finding the NEP of a network consists of 
parallel links and analyze its properties. , 
Let Xi be the flow rate of link i 
Pi be the price of the link i 
d be the congestion externalities of link i 
We consider the case for inelastic demand to ease our calculation and assume 
each link is owned by different owners to prevent the case of price collusion of several 
links. Each link has a total end-to-end cost of p^ +c^x^ = 4 , we f toher assume that 
min(4) = A and the total demand is ^x^. = / . The objective of this problem is to 
maximize each link profit. The maximization problem can be formulated as follow: 
Maximize p^x^ subject to (凡,x,) e D = 
y.，< ) ^ 沢2+ 1 2 X = f , P � i + c X = A or x\ = 0} 
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To analyze this network, we solve for the equilibrium point first. Assume there 
are n links with flows greater than zero and satisfied the Kuhn-Tucker conditions and 
we want to find the equilibrium demand X/ of the following equations. 




We formulate the above equations as matrix notation to find a general solution 
to it: 
i^ + MY" = 0 
r ~n � A n � — 
A ^\ 0 • . 1 ^1 
p^ 0 c : 0 . 1 ^2 
. + = 0 (16.) 
Pn 0 . . Cn 1 X” 
- / 1 1 . . 0 - A 
L J J L JL_ _J 
o rJT = - M - i p 
Now consider again the maximization problem, the first order condition is: 
dx^ . 
V. ~ ~ - + x,. = 0 
± l r> i 
尔、 (17.) 
ox. 
P i - = -^i 
^Pi 
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From (16), we can determine dxJdp^ as well as the demand in terms of>/. We 
get n price reaction curve for the whole network. The price reaction curve is the price 
setting strategy ofthe each link's owners given its competitor's strategy in the last stage. 
We let: 
Px ^ - 0 0 
^Px 
^ d . • . 
0 P 2 — .. •• ： 
V = 郎2 . V . . . • • « • • • • • • • • • 
. . . 3 n ‘ ： •• •• Pn^ 0 
3Pn 
、 0 0 - l j 
From (16) and (17)，we may come up with the following formula: 
V [ - M - ' P ) = M - ' P (18.) 
The above formula contains n price reaction curve plus 1 identity in which we 
don't use it. Since we model the parallel network as a non-cooperate game, at each 
stage the owners of the link try to maximize its next stage profit by setting a new price 
base on the its price reaction curve. Eventually, no carrier will change the links price. 
We can use the above formula to solve for equilibrium price and demand of each link. 
Upon solving, M^ is found to be 
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/ n n n n n^ 、 
-ZEK EK rk -EK 
/^ 1 j:Ai /^l.2 /^ l>3 /实1 n n n n 
n ^ ' _ Z E K - E K 
—I /^ l,2 i^2 j^i /^ 2 
. • • 
n n ^ • • • • • 
SU^/ FTc, 
‘』对 ,^ln n n n 
-n�’ -Eh Ek 
V^  />i 1*2 J y 
Substitute M^ into (18) and rearrange terms, we come up with the following 
equation: , 
/ n n n n n � 
2 X E K - n ^ ' - r i c ' _ n 。 r - 、 
/;tl j ^ i i^\,2 '*l,3 / d , / \ I Q 
n n n_ _n P\ 丄丄‘ 
E h 2 ^ n s - r i c ' P2 “ ： 
i^l,2 i*2 J*i '*2,/j . 
： : : ： = f \ . . • • • ^ • 
^ . . 
• • • . ： ： • . - c^ • . n 
ij^n-l,n n 1 ~f 
n n n n \^"J 丄丄<^, 
_ r i q - n 。 2 i r i s 、 ' " ^ 
. � i^\,n i^2,n i^n j^ ) 
A simple case when the externality of each link are equal, i.e. c, = Cj = c, the 
equation can be simplified to: 
(-2{n-X) 1 . . 1 丫凡） 
1 - 2 ( ^ - l ) • . 1 p , 
. . . . . ： = c f (19.) 
1 • 
. • • • A • 
V 1 1 . . - 2 ( ^ - l ) J U . 
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cf 
Upon solving for (19), we get p, = P j = ^ ^ . Substitute this into (16) or by 
symmetry, we have for optimal routing of traffic x, =x�=f|n. The profit of each 
owner will be cf^/n{n-l) and it is very clear that revenue is driven to zero in such an 
environment with many competing links. On the other hand, users are better off for the 
reduction of price. 
4,3 Price Collusion for Serial Networks 
The second part of this section focuses on the price collusion for serial 
networks. We also want to show the existence of such a network under reasonable 
concavity conditions and analyze its properties. 
4.3.1 Model and Problem Formulation 
Similar to the case for a network with parallel links, now we are given a se tM = 
{ 1, 2, •.., M } of service providers, which own a set of serial communication links L = 
{ 1, 2, ..., L } interconnecting a common source node to a common destination node as 
shown in figure 20. We assume that the number of service providers is smaller than the 
number of links and that each link can be owned by at most one service provider. We 
also let L^ be the set oflink 1 e L owned by service provider m e M. 
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destination ^ 
y / link n 






. / l inkl y 
(Pi，x^y^ source 
Figure 20: serial network 
We assume that each service provider does not cooperate with each other in 
setting up the communication links' price and its main objective is to maximize its total 
revenue. The total cost of a path ;； from the source to the destination is the sum of the 
links price given by 少二^ (凡+^ )^, where p^ is the price for link 1 and c! is the 
congestion extemality of link 1. The network has a throughput demand d，which is 
some ergodic process that depends on the cost ofthe path y . 
At the beginning of each stage, service provider i is able to decide the price Pi 
of the links it owns as long as p； > 0 (nonnegativity constraint), so that the demand d 
o f t h e network depends on the system price configuration p = { p i , P 2 , . " , P i h where 
Pi e [0,oo) VI e L . The revenue of a link 1 is given by A \ ( P ) . 丁。ease our notation, 
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we define P e [0,oo)^ be the set containing all possible p and that P, c [0,co) be the 
set containing all possible p!. The performance measure of a service provider m e M 
is given by a revenue function J^ (p ) , which is the same notation as the case for 
parallel links. 
To state it again, a feasible system price configuration p’=Cpi’，P2’，...，i^ L’) is a 
Nash Equilibrium Point ^SfEP) if, for all m e M, the following condition holds: 
J ^ ( p ’ ) = r " O V ， . " , i V i ' , i V , ; V i ’ , . " , i V ) = m 、 r | « r O V ” . - , i ^ , H ’ ’ P , , A + i，”. . ,P A / ) 
Pm"+ 
We are now going to show the existence of NEP under reasonable concavity 
assumption. 
4.3.2 Existence of Nash Equilibrium Point 
Under the assumption 1-4 in section 3.3, we have the following theorem: 
Theorem 4.3: Consider a network of serial links with continuous revenue functions 
jm (p), which are concave in Pi V/ e L^，an NEP is guaranteed to exist. 
We take assumption 6-7 also, and give out the following Lemma: 
Lemma 3.6: The revenue functions J^(p) of a network consist of serial links, with 
linear cost and linear inelastic demand functions are concave in Pi V/ G L^,. 
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To show the concavity of the revenue function J^ (p), we use theorem 3.1, 3.2 
and the following example to demonstrate it. 
Consider a serial network with 3 links owned by different owner, the cost of the 
links are oftype-A while the demand function of the links are of type-B, we then obtain 
the following equations: 
少1 二 Px +。1工1 
少 2 二 Pl + ^ 2 ^ 2 
少3 = P7> + ^ 3^ 3 产 
y 二 少1 + ^ 2 + ^ 3 
d = f -炒 
At equilibrium, the flow of the path is found to be: 
d = f-eij)\ +qxi +P2+c^x^ +;73+C3X3) 
And the revenue functions J^ (p) of each service providers are: 
Ji = p,{f-e{p, +qx! +p^ +C2X2 +Ps+c,x^)) 
J^ = P2 (/ - ^iPx + ^i^i + Pi + ^2^2 + P3 + ^ 3^3)) 
J' = P3{f-4P1 +^1^1 +P2 +^2^2 ^P3 +C3X3)) 
We also require that the flow and the price of the links are non-negative, i.e. 
f-e(j>Y +^1^1 + P 2 + < % +p^+c^x^)>Q 
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Since we require the concavity of the revenue functions to depend only on the 
price for the links owned by the service provider, to obtain the Hessian matrix, we only 
need to differentiate the revenue function by the price two times. It is found to be: 
a ^ _ a ^ _ a ^ _ 2 ^ 
dp] dpl dp] 
In general, the Hessian matrix obtain from any number oflinks is equal to 2e, 
so that for e > 0, NEP is guarantee to exist, but for inelastic demand, i.e. e 二 0 , NEP 
may not exist. In fact, it is easy to see that the price for each link will increase to 
infinity. 
In the next subsection, we will demonstrate the numerical example of a network 
consist ofserial links and show the existence of the NEP and analyze its properties. 
4.3.3 Numerical Example and Properties 
For a network with several serial links, owned by different owners, we may 
formulate the network optimization problem as follows: 
Let X be the flow rate 
pi be the rental price of link i 
Ci be the externality of link i 
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We first consider the case when different owners own a link facing an elastic 
demand. For simplicity, the demand function is x = f-ey, where y 二 ^]0^, +c^x), 
which is the end-to-end link price. 
The objective ofeach owner is the same, which is to maximize the profit o f the 
link of the owner, i.e. max ppc. At equilibrium, the demand for this serial link network 
is given by: 
x = / - < E O w ) (20.) 
{ec + l)x = f-eJ]p, ‘ 
where c - [ c , 
We then formulate this profit maximization problem as a non-linear 
optimization: 
Maximize ppc subject to 0?, ,x) e D 二 {0?�，x') e ^1 | {ec + l)x' 二 f - e^>'/1 
The first order condition to the objective function require: 
dx 八 
p.——+ X = 0 
叙 
from (20), we get dx/dp, = - e|{ec +1), 
i.e. x = ep,/(ec + l) (21.) 
from (20), (21) 
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P ' + ^ P j (22.) 
(22) is the price reaction curve of link i for this serial network. We model this 
pricing model as a non-cooperate game in which each link set its price in different time 
instant base on the information of other links' price setting. 
We now need to solve the equilibrium price and demand. We formulate the n 
reaction curve as matrix notation: 
f2 1 . . l f A ) ( f ! A ^ 
1 2 . . 1 p, f|e 
. . 2 • . • — • 
• • • 鲁 • • • 
J 1 • • 2 A p J yf|e^ 
The above matrix corresponds to the n reaction curve. We now need to solve 
MP = F fo rP , i . e .P = M"^F. 
f n - 1 . . - 1 ) 
- 1 n . . - 1 
It can be shown that M—�二 . . n • . 
77 + 1 
、一1 - 1 . . n ) 
f 
That means P,=P^ =... = P„ = ( � � (23.) 
(77 + \)e 
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a n d t h a t x ^ " ' � ' (24.) 
\ + ec 
We now analyze the effect when increasing number of competitor entering the 
market. To the limit, when n tends to inf1nity,j:7tends to zero and that: 
limYj!；, 二 l i m . 对 、 
n—co ^ ^ n — M ( / 7 + l j e 
=lim -^ 
n—co ( 丄 
1 + - e 
\ n) 
: L ^ 
e 
f-eY Pi 
1 • 1 • J / I J^ 1 
limx = lim 
rt—00 rt—oO 1 + QC 
= 0 
That means the end-to-end link price is equal to f j e . Compare with the 
monopolistic case, when n 二 1, 
p - i , - f 
2(ec + l) 
^ / ( l + 2cg) 
^ " e ( 2 + 2ce) 
This shows that a serial network of competing links suppresses demand and 
price even more than the case of monopolistic ownership of each link. We also note 
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that, since {l + 2ce)/{2 + 2ce) must be less than 1, users are better off for the 
monopolistic case as the end-to-end cost are lower than that of the competitive case. 
Also, from (23), P, = P, = . • • = P, = j - ^ and if we let e goes to zero, which 
(?? +1 )e 
is the case for inelastic demand, P, = P^  = . . . = P„ tends to infinity as e tends to zero. 
Finally, if a service provider owns more than one link, the determination of the 
equilibrium price and the price setting strategy of each service provider is similar to the 
case when we assume one carrier owns one link. We group links with'same owner 
together and consider the service provider has to set an aggregate price for the links. 
Then we come up with the same serial-link problem with fewer price reaction curves. 
,Customers are better off as end-to-end price decrease for fewer links. Service providers 
are also better off as the revenue increase as a result of increasing demand. 
4.4 Summary 
In this part, we have investigated some economics models of network 
interconnections. The revenue of each carrier in a highly competitive parallel network 
will drive to zero while the traffic will increase since price is lowered. It is better to 
collude the links in the serial network as users are better off for the monopolistic case. 
The end-to-end cost are lower than that of the competitive case. In the next section, we 
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will investigate properties of a simple hybrid network, the series-parallel network with 
dominant carriers. 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING - 8 4 -
Chapter 5 
Price Distortion for Series-Parallel Networks 
with Dominant Carriers 
5.1 Problem Motivation and Formulation 
We have said that a dominant driving economic forces for interconnection are 
positive network externalities. But if the Internet matures into an .infrastructure with 
dominant market players, interconnection may no longer be consistent with a business' 
competitive strategy. Regulation may then be necessary for the Internet service 
provision market to require companies to interconnect. For the case in Hong Kong, 
competition policy is fast becoming one of the major issues in the regulation and 
licensing of broadcast and telecommunications industries [30]. The regulation o f t h e 
Hong Kong Telephone Company (HKTC) is the most complex competition policy 
issues. Simply speaking, we can describe the public telecommunication network as 
three logically distinct but physically connected layers. Level 1 is called the retail 
service providers. HKT-IMS and all other Internet service providers are all Level 1 
providers. Level 2 refers to the basic network infrastructure, which provides trunk line 
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and switching facilities to link service provider and the end user. Level 3 refers to the 
local access facilities, which connect the end-users' terminal equipment with the Level 
2 provider. The dominance of HKTC is explained by its vertically integration of all 
three level. Although Level 1 is competitive, HKTC has a dominance position in Level 
2 and Level 3. Other service providers need to lease the trunk line and service from 
HKTC in which HKTC can charge a price which is comparatively higher then that to 
HKT-IMS. In this chapter, we would like to construct a simple network consisting of 
series-parallel links, which shows the effects of the existence of parallel alternative 
paths, which are owned by dominant carriers. In addition, we would then give a detail 
analysis to the effect of demand elasticity and the network externality to the 
equilibrium point of this solution. Further, we end this section with a discussion of 
pricing regulations for the proper level of charges for access. 
We first formulate this problem and find a solution to it. For the series-parallel 
network shown in figure 21, where M = {1,2} and L = {1,2,3,4}, suppose a non-
dominant carrier owns link 1, L^  = {1}, while a dominant carrier facing the competition 
owns link 2. Assume there exists a alternate path composes of link 3 and link 4, which 
are also owned by the dominant carrier, L^  = {2,3,4}, going from the source to the 
destination in this routing network. The small competitor must purchase access from 
the dominant carrier in order to establish an end-to-end connection. The solution to this 
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problem is the equilibrium demand and link price of the network if each carrier want to 
maximize the total profit. 
, l i n k y " ^ ^ ^ ^ i n k 3 、 \ 
、 丨 ( ) 卜 
\ l i n k i y ^ ^ ^ l i n k 4 / 
Figure 21: series-parallel network ‘ 
We first formulate this pricing competition problem as follows: 
Let Xp be the flow rate of path p 
pi be the price of the link 1 
c, be the congestion externalities constant 0fpath7 
yp be the total cost of path p 
d be the traffic demand 
Further, the total path cost and the demand function of the network is as 
f o l l ows : 
7i =P\ +Pi +¥1 
少2 = P 3 + ^ 2 ' ^ 2 
d = f 一 ey 
X, + X2 = d 
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Where the Kuhn Tucker condition is that _y = min(_yj.) and Xj=Oifyji^y, e 
and / a r e constant in the demand function. The dominant carrier owned link 2, 3 and 4 
and the competitor owned link 1. ps is the aggregate price for link 3 and link 4. 
There are two objectives ofthis problem, one is from the dominant carrier while 
the other is from its competitor. We may general write them as: 
/ \ 
maximize ^ Pi ^ x ^ 
尸/经91+ leL„, all path p 
y containing 1 y 
subject to Yj^p = f - e y 
yp 二 3^  =^ Xp > 0 
少厂 > y => Xp = 0 
where y = mmy^ 
We use the method similar to theorem 3.2 and theorem 3.3 and try to show the 
existence ofNEP of this hybrid network. 
First, the revenue function of the two service provider are given by: 
Ji =p,x, 
j 2 =p^x, +p^x^ 
For NEP to be guaranteed to exist, the revenue functions J ' must be concave in 
Pi, while j 2 must be concave in p j and p^. The equilibrium demand involves 
solving the following simultaneous equation: 
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X i + X 2 = / - e f o + P 2 + C i A ) 
^ l + ^ 2 = / - ^ O ^ 3 + ^ 2 ^ 2 ) 
It is found to be: 
^ _ -Px-P2+^2{f-^iP1 +P2)) + P3 
1 c,+c2+c,c^e (25) 
^ _ c j + p,+p2-{l + c,e)p, 
2 Cj +C2 +c^c2e 
The revenue functions of the two service provider is found to be: 
,1 Pi{-P, -Pi +c^{f-4Pi +P2))^P3) ‘ 
J — “ “ 
Cj + C2 +Cj^2^ 
j2 _ P2(CJ + P1 +P2 -{^ + C,e)p,)^p2{-p, -P2 +C2{f-^iP.l +Pl)) + ?^) 
Cj +C2 +C^C2e 
The revenue functions / and f are well defined when the corresponding flow 
and price are non-negative. From (25), the valid range of the Xp and pi are: 
-Px-P2+^2{f-^{P1 ^P2))^P3^^ 
q / + A + P 2 - ( l + Y ) P 3 > 0 
S,Pi ^ 0 
The Hessian matrixes of the negative of the revenue functions are evaluated as: 
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^ [ _ j i ] J _ _ f e a ^ L _ " 
[ 2 q +C2 +2qC2^_ 
“ 2 ( l + c^e) - 2 “ 
r 2l 2cj +C2 +2^1^2^ 2c^ +C2 +2qc2^ 
- 2 2 + 4c^g 
2cj + 2^ + 2cjC2^ 2cj + 2^ + 2cjC2^_ 
Applying Sylvester's Theorem, the two Hessian matrixes are positive 
semidefinite and so the two revenue functions are concave in the price o f the links in 
which the owner owns. 
5.2 Properties under NEP 
Returning to the problem, let's analyze the properties of this hybrid example. 
Recall the equilibrium flow of the network given by: 
X 二 -Pi -Pi +^2(/-g(A +;^2)) + ;^3 
1 c,+c^+c,c^e (26) 
— Ci/ + A + J ^ 2 - ( l + ¥ ) A . 
^ 2 一 ： “ q +C2 +c^c^e 
The first order conditions to maximizing the objective function are given: 
^ ( A ^ l ) ^ Q 
^Px 
^ ( P 2 ^ 2 + P 3 ^ 2 ) ^ Q ( 2 7 . ) 
^Pi …… 
^ 2 ^ 2 , 1 ^ 1 ^ ) = 0 
^P3 
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After substitute (25) into (26), we found the price reaction curve to be: 
_-{l + c^e)p^+p^+cJ 
几 一 2 + 2^2^ 
_-{l + c^e)p,+2p,+cJ 
朽 二 2 + 2^e 
_p,^2p^+cJ 
内 _ ““2 + 2^~~ 
We have modeled the pricing competition as an n-stage non-cooperate game. 
The price reaction curve is the price setting strategy of the link in response to the 
strategy of the opponent in the previous stage. At each stage, both service providers 
will set the price ofthe links they own base on the price reaction curves ofthe links and 
the price setting of the competitor in the last stage. 
Here we givean analysis ofthe three reaction curves. As an illustration purpose, 
we let戶10, e=l; Ci=C2=l and draw the three reaction curve in figure 22-24: 
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-奪-春 
Figure 22: Price reaction curve of/?/ Figure 23: Price Reaction Curve forp2 
- _ _ 
10° 
Figure 24: Price Reaction Curve forpj 
It is easily seen that p2 has a more positive effect to p3 than pj and also the p2 is 
nearly always higher than p,. Since for the same path, the price of the link owned by 
the dominant service provider is always higher than that of the non-dominant service 
provider, we conclude that the non-dominant service provider worse off when there 
exists a dominant carrier who owns part of the competitive link. 
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We have modeled such series-parallel network as a non-cooperative n-stage 
game. At each stage the link's owner dynamically set the link price based on the 
strategy of the price reaction curve. The intersection point of three price reaction curves 
marks the equilibrium price of the network, which we called the Nash equilibrium 
point. No service provider is willing to alter the price of the links it own since any 
altering will decrease the its revenue. The intersection point can be solve by fmding the 
solution of the three simultaneous equations and the equilibrium price and demand of 
each link are found to be: ‘ 
凡 二 ^ ^ 
n S + Sc^e 
_(3^3c,e)f 
厂2 - 6^(1 + ^2^ ) 
Ps=f (28.) 
2e 
^ — ^ 2 / 
1 3(c,+c,+c,c,e) 
I _ ( c , + 3 c ^ ( l + c , g ) ) / 
2 6(1 + c2e)(c1 +C2 +C1C2e) 
It is a little bit surprising that the equilibrium price setting of the three links is 
independent of the extemality of the first path and that of the price of link 3 depends 
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only on the demand function. At the same time, the profit of the dominant carrier and 
f \ 
its competitor is given by ^ p^ Yu^? and is solve as: 
leLm all path p 
� containing / J 
c , ' f 
P r o _ o n 一 dominant)=今(! + � ) ( � + � ] + � � ) 
� ( 9 ( c , + c J + c, {9c. + 4^2 )e)/2 
profit(dominant) = ^ ； ； . � w ^ ” “ � 
^ 36e ( l + C2^X^i+C2 +c^c^e) 
It is apparent from (28) the price setting of the parallel alternate link of the 
dominant service provider does not depend on the competitive price setting of the 
network. From the equilibrium price of network, the price for link 3 only depends on 
the demand function, the dominant carrier would set an exorbitant price with infinite 
revenue if the demand is highly inelastic. 
As a simple case, when e 二 ci = c2 = 1, we should have the following 
equilibrium point: 
f 5 / f 
『 ？ " 2 = Y ^ ， P 3 = Y 
_/ _lJ_ 
x^ 一 ，x^ — 1 9 2 36 
f2 7 / 2 
profit(non - dominant) = ^ , profit(dominant) = - ^ 
So, it is very clear that there exist price distortion to the non-dominant carrier if 
the dominant carrier owns part of a competitive link in the series-parallel network. 
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5.3 A Simple Simulation 
The question is how much should the non-dominant carrier pay the dominant 
carrier to complete the connections. No best solution currently exists and any solution 
will make one side worse off and distort the openness of the competitive market. But 
we try to borrow the idea of reciprocity [14] that both networks charge the same for 
interconnection. We regulate the price setting of the carrier that the price set by the 
dominant carrier for the competitive link must not higher than the non-dominant 
carrier. That means p : < p^ • So the three price reaction curve will now change to: 
_-{l + c^e)p^+p,+cJ 
凡 一 2 + 2^2^ 
-(l + c.e)p. + 2p. +C2f j . 
P2 = ^ ‘ ： \ ~ ~ - a n d ; 7 2 ^Pi 
n 2 + 2^ 2^  
_Pi+^Pi^cJ 
P'— 2 + 2c,e 
The simple solving of three simultaneous equations does not work in this case 
and we do a simulation to find out if equilibrium exists for such a configuration. 
In the first part of the simulation, we show that there exist an equilibrium point 
for the series-parallel network and that the convergence rate is quite high. We try all the 
combination o f f , e, cj and c2 ranging from 1 to 10 and count the number of iteration 
needed for convergence. Both the original network and the policed one are simulated 
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and figure 25-26 show the result of it. We find that the solution of the network 
convergence at 9 iteration over 80% of time and never diverge and the maximum 
number oftime need for convergence is only 24. 
no. of times 




： \ 2 。 i \ 
/ \ A ^ ^ .1 ^ . ^ / \ / \ - no. of i terat ion 
J_ \ 八 y. no. of Iteration H i Tn ^ 20 Ts 
^ 5 ~~T5 n 20 2S 
Figure 25: series-parallel network without Figure 26: series-parallel networkwith policy 
policy 
Table 7 shows a typical convergence sequence of a series-parallel network 
without the imposition of policy. The iteration result is just nearly the same as that 
calculated from the equation. We have also calculated the cost for an end-to-end 
delivery for each iteration. It is used for analyze of social welfare when compared with 
the network with policy imposed. 
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^ ^ y ^ j ^ ^ ^ j | ^ ^ ^ j j Q j | | Q | j | ^ ^ | F J J ^ J j y ^ f l | | B B Q I S ^ ^ S ! ^ l l l ^ B ! ^ ^ ^ l 
0 0.01 0.01 0.01 3 3 _ ^ _ 0 . 3 3 0.67 33 ^ 
^ “ 25 25 25 ^ _ ^ 208 1040 58 58 
2 18.8 25 44 18.7 18.8 350 1290 63 63 
3 ' 23 .4 3 7 」 g _ 6 ^ _ 2 5 . 5 159 1333 68 68 
4 16.8—34 50 15.8 17.3 265 1400 67 67 
5 20.2 41 ^ 7 7 _ 2 2 . 9 156 1380 69 69 
24 " l 6 . 6 _ _ ^ _ ~ _ ^ _ 1 1 . 3 19.3 187 1440 69 69 
Equilibriumpointcalculated~~16.7 42 50 11.1 19.4 185 1440 69 69 
from equation 
Table 7: Iteration result for series-parallel network without policy with (^100, e=l, Cj=l, C2=l) 
At the second part of the simulation, we have tried several configurations with 
d i f ferent / e, c； and c2 to test for the efficiency of the policy. We find that under less 
elastic condition, the distortion between pi and p2 is quite large and the imposition of 
the policy better off both the non-dominant carrier and the traffic since the cost to the 
end-to-end transmission is lower. But we note that the effect of the dominant carrier 
diminishes under elastic demand flmction and the policy has little effect on the 
network. We may conclude that the imposition of policy is good when the demand is 
less elastic while there is no need to impose it under high elasticity demand. 
M Q Q j j j | | | j | j j | | ^ ^ j j ^ j j ^ 5 | | J | [ ^ J ^ 3 J I 5 ^ ^ n i B S $ l B ^ ^ ^ ^ l l B l ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ l 
0 O.Q1 0.01 0.01 33 ^ 0.33 0.67 33 ^ 
1 — 25 25 ^ ^ _ ^ 208 1040 58 ^ 
2 — 18.8 18.8 44 22.9 16.7 430 1160 60 ^ 
3 — 2 6 . 6 2 6 ^ 3 9 10.9 25 291 1270 64 64 
4 _ 2 1 . 5 2 1 . 5 _ _ ^ 19.7 17.7 420 1220 63 ^ 
5 '25.5 2 5 . 5 _ J ^ 13.1 22.9 330 1270 64 ^ 
14 23.7 23.7 4 3 _ 16.1 20.5 380 1260 63 63 
Equilibrium point without policy 16.7 |42 lsQ | l1. l |l9.4 | l85 |l440 [ ^ 1 ^ 
INTERNET ROUTING AND PRICING " 叨 " 
Chapter 5 Price Distortionfor Series-Parallel Networks with Dominant Carriers 
calculated from equation 
Table 8: Iteration result for series-parallel network with policy with (/^100, e=l, C;=1, C2=l) 
l ^ g g ^ j j ^ ^ ^ j j P J | ^ J H 3 l | | p j [ ^ ^ B P f f l f l i p ^ ^ B ^ B S f f l B ^ B f f T ! ! W 
Q 0.01 0.01 0.01 3.12 3.12 0.0312 0.062 9.4 M 
1 — 4 . 8 ^ 8 ~ 4 . 8 _ 0 . 0 5 3 1.66 0.259 8.3 ^ i § 
2 2.5 2.5 5 . 1 ~ ~ 1 5 6 1.54 3.9 11-7 9.7 ^ 
3 3.7 3.7 5 0 j ^ l 6 _ 2 . 9 6 10.9 9.8 ^ 8 
4 3.08 3.08 5 1.19 1.57 3.7 11-5 9.7 ^ 
5 3.4 3 ^ _ _ V _ 1 1.58 3.4 11.3 9.7 i Z 
8 3.3 3.3 5 ~ 1 0 7 _ 1 5 8 _ ^ 11-4 9.7 i Z 
Equilibrium point without policy 3.2 3.4 5 1.04 1.58 3.4 11.4 9.7 9.7 
calculated from equation 
Table 9: Iteration result for series-parallel network with policy with (/^100, ^10^C/=3, Cj=3) 
5.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have model a simple network with a dominant service 
provider in order to explain some issues about the competition policy in Hong Kong. 
When there exists a dominant service provider who owns a parallel alternate path in a 
network, the non-dominant service provider may be worse of .as a result of price 
distortion. We must impose some regulation such as price ceiling to improve 
competition in the interconnection network. 
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Conclusion 
In this thesis, we studied the theories of Internet Pricing and Routing. The 
economics models of network interconnections are being analyzed. For a network 
consisting ofseveral non-cooperate service providers, they will set the price ofthe links 
they owned so as to maximize their total revenue. The service provider set the price of 
the link base on the price reaction curve of each link and we prove that i f the revenue 
functions of the service provider is concave and continuously differentiable with 
respect to link price, an Nash equilibrium point is guarantee to exist. This is proved 
with the help of the Kakutani fixed point theorem. At the Nash equilibrium point, no 
service provider will find it beneficial to alter the price of the links they owned and the 
network becomes stable. 
We have also shown that the revenue of each carrier in a highly competitive 
parallel network will drive to zero while the traffics will be better off for the low price. 
Also it is better to collude the links in the serial network as users are better off for the 
monopolistic case since the end-to-end cost are lower than that of the competitive case. 
For the series-parallel network with dominant carriers, we propose some regulation on 
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price ceiling for the dominant carrier and have analyze its effect. For general 
interconnection network, we provide a "Cookbook" procedure to find out the 
equilibrium price vector of the network. A main step to do is to fmd out weather the 
revenue function is concave in the link price or not，and we use the Sylvester's 
Theorem to test the Hessian matrix of the revenue function to do it. 
Finally, we will present the interconnection between QoS routing and pricing in 
the Intemet. In QoS routing, two main issues must be stressed, which is the modeling of 
the network and the routing problem itself. To link with our pricing theory, we here 
give a brief presentation on the work by [18], [19] on the modeling and the routing of 
the network, then integrate it with our pricing in the Intemet. 
First，in [18], it propose a thermodynamic theory for broadband networks 
relating quantities such as QoS, bandwidth assignment, buffer assignment, and 
bandwidth demand, a scalability postulate is propose for such four quantities. The main 
use of the scalability postulate is that the performance of a queueing system or the 
model of the network can be obtained by scaling down the parameters of the system. 
Then we compute the QoS for the scaled system through simulation and then rescaling 
it to the original size to obtain the QoS or the model of the network. And for the case of 
our pricing problem, we may use such an approach to obtain the pricing signal in the 
network but first scaling down the network and do the simulations. 
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In [19], the authors use a game theoretical approach for calculating the routing. 
They consider the network shared by several non-cooperate users, who is in our case 
the service providers. Each user seeks to optimize its own performance by controlling 
the route of its flow, giving rise to a non-cooperative game. In our pricing problem, 
each service provider seeks to optimize its total revenue by adjusting the link price, this 
also give rise to a non-cooperative game. The solution of the routing problem and our 
pricing problem is quite similar in which we can show the existence of a Nash 
equilibrium point in the network under certain convexity criteria. In- the pricing 
problem, it is a little complicated that the equilibrium is done in two stage, the first is 
the equilibrium ofthe flow and the second is the equilibrium ofthe price. 
As a final words, Internet is growing very fast and the congestion problem is 
getting worse and worse. The current flat fee pricing mechanism will introduce some 
congestion externalities. For later research, one can try to do more simulation on new 
pricing mechanism on the effect on Internet routing problem. We think that in the 
future, an automatically pricing system is introduced, the link price of the network is 
dynamically changed, like the routing path of a packet. Each user connection or packet 
is stamped with a price ceiling, that is the maximum price the user can afford and the 
routing problem is to route the packet to the path with minimum cost. 
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